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Abstract
Scholars have long explored questions concerning presidential foreign policy decision
making as well as military performance in conducting operations. Studies have covered a wide
variety of topics, including the organizational dynamics of the military bureaucracy, the
effectiveness of military operations, how presidential rhetorical strategies influence the public
agenda in foreign affairs, and, in turn, how public opinion influences presidential foreign policy
decision-making. Despite these advances, there remains a notable gap in the literature with
respect to the relationship between presidential foreign policy objectives and military
bureaucratic responsiveness. In particular, when presidents use rhetoric to introduce key shifts in
foreign policy directives, to what extent can subsequent actions taken by the military reflect real
policy change? To date, scholars have yet to thoroughly examine the connection between
foreign policy shifts in presidential rhetoric and the extent to which the military is able to
effectively transform its operations to meet such executive policy directives.
In this study, I develop a full theoretical framework to explore this relationship and apply
it by conducting a case analysis of the 2011 U.S. transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to
Operation New Dawn (i.e., the shift from “combat” to “advice and assist” operations). My
findings provide a new contribution to the literature on executive-bureaucratic performance and
offer new avenues for future studies applicable to scholars, policy makers, and military
professionals.
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Chapter 1: Modeling Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Executive Policy
Directives
Scholars have long explored questions concerning presidential foreign policy decision
making as well as military performance in conducting operations. Studies have covered a wide
variety of topics, including the organizational dynamics of the military bureaucracy, the
effectiveness of military operations, how presidential rhetorical strategies influence the public
agenda in foreign affairs, and, in turn, how public opinion influences presidential foreign policy
decision-making. Despite these advances, there remains a notable gap in the literature with
respect to the relationship between presidential foreign policy objectives and military
bureaucratic responsiveness. In particular, when presidents use rhetoric to introduce key shifts in
foreign policy directives, to what extent do the subsequent actions taken by the military reflect
real policy change? Does the rhetoric of a policy directive match the reality of what occurs on
the ground? To date, scholars have yet to thoroughly examine the connection between foreign
policy shifts in presidential rhetoric and the extent to which the military is able to be responsive
in effectively transforming its operations to meet such executive policy directives.
In this study, I develop a full theoretical framework that evaluates the gap between
executive policy directives and bureaucratic outputs (which I refer to as the rhetoric-policy gap),
as well as provide a systemic method to identify the extent to which bureaucracies are responsive
in meeting such directives.

This theoretical framework, titled the Bureaucratic-Executive

Assessment of Responsiveness (BEAR) Model, is then applied to a case study of the U.S.
transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn (i.e., the shift from “combat”
to “advice and assist” operations) to demonstrate how the model functions and to provide an
1

analysis of the case. My findings provide a new contribution to the literature on executivebureaucratic performance and offer new avenues for future studies applicable to scholars, policy
makers, and bureaucratic professionals.

1.1

THESIS ROADMAP
In examining the relationship between presidential foreign policy directives and military

bureaucratic outputs, this thesis is divided into six steps: 1) in chapter one, I will first examine
the current literature on the executive-bureaucratic relationship, 2) next, I will develop and
discuss the theoretical framework used to assess the rhetoric-policy gap and bureaucratic
responsiveness, 3) starting chapter two, I will introduce the transition from Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) to Operation New Dawn (OND) and explain why it was selected for the case
study, 4) I will then discuss the pertinent literature specific to military bureaucracies and national
security policy, 5) after which I will conduct the case analysis using the BEAR model, 6) and
lastly, I will provide an assessment of the model developed. Below I provide greater detail on
these six steps and offer the context for the rhetoric-policy gap and the complexities of
bureaucratic responsiveness.
Step One: Identifying the Gap in the Literature
Although scholars have often alluded to the rhetoric-policy gap within a rich and
expansive literature on presidential foreign policy decision making, no work to my knowledge
has developed a full theoretical framework to directly explore the rhetoric-policy gap. Current
research falls on the periphery of the topic and tends to cover varying components of such a gap
(which I adopt into my model), focusing mainly on either presidential or bureaucratic
performance, which is how I break down my assessment of the literature. Accordingly, I first
2

examine the literature on presidential power, the decision-making process of executive foreign
(and domestic) policy outputs, and the increasing role that the executive has played in using the
bureaucracy to meet policy goals. Thereafter, I discuss literature on the bureaucratic-executive
relationship, the role of centralization and politicization, the components that make bureaucracies
resilient or cooperative, and the current uses of the term “bureaucratic responsiveness.” In each
part of this section, I will demonstrate where my contribution falls within this literature.
Step Two: Constructing the Model
In Section 1.3 of the thesis, I develop the Bureaucratic-Executive Assessment of
Responsiveness Model1 (see Figure 1.1 below), and discuss its varying components. While the
model is discussed in depth in the aforementioned section, here I provide a more general
overview of its components and the terminology that will be referenced throughout the course of
the thesis. The BEAR Model provides the theoretical framework that examines two
phenomenon: the rhetoric-policy gap and bureaucratic responsiveness to policy directives2. The
rhetoric-policy gap is the difference between an executive’s policy directive and the
bureaucracy’s policy output(s). In other words, it is an assessment of whether the rhetoric of
what the executive told the bureaucracy to do matches the reality of what actions the bureaucracy
performed. Differing from previous research, the relationship between a policy directive and a
policy output as proposed here does not examine the decision-making process, which occurs
1

Figure 1.1 is provided here for an overview, a full page layout of this model is found in Appendix A.
It is important to point out the difference between applying the BEAR Model, and using alternative theoretical
frameworks, such as principal-agent theory. While principal-agent theory provides a framework to examine topdown models where a bureaucratic entity is the agent that the executive is directing (which can explain the
presidential power node discussed further below), principal-agent theory cannot always capture the terminology and
expectations found in a policy directive nor account for the rhetoric-policy gap as it applies to message compatibility
(see Section 1.3). As applied here, the BEAR Model builds on and compliments the principal-agent theory
framework as it can fill in additional information that would not otherwise be captured. Nevertheless, in other
related research contexts, principal-agent theory can explain some phenomenon of bureaucratic responsiveness that
the BEAR Model cannot, such that it may be adopted more broadly to complement the framework applied here (see
footnote 42 below).
2

3

Figure 1.1: The BEAR Model
prior to an executive giving a policy directive, nor does it provide a method to assess the success
of such policy output, which is an examination between the policy output itself and the desired
result of such policy.3 Instead, this model focuses on the actual policy directive given to the
bureaucracy by the executive and the action(s) that the bureaucracy performed.
If one is looking only to assess the rhetoric-policy gap, a researcher or policy maker can
use the criteria disused in Section 1.3 to examine the relationship between “Policy Directive” and
“Policy Output” in Figure 1.1. To develop an assessment of the expected levels of the rhetoricpolicy gap, one can use the complete model. The complete model includes a consideration for
the key conditions that may contribute to (and thereby increase) the rhetoric-policy gap from the
time a president sets out a directive (which itself includes an initial or baseline gap between what

3

While this model is not directly employed to assess the elements of developing policy directives and the results of
policy outputs, these are certainly important components to unraveling the bureaucratic-executive relationship and
merit further consideration in future studies. For example, the success or failure of a policy output is not examined
within the context of the model, as the BEAR Model focuses on what the output was in relation to the policy
directive (i.e., whether the output matched what the president requested). Assessments of success and failure lend
themselves to decision-making and principle-agent models where actors can assess if the output had the desired
effect based on their goals and utility functions, and then determine whether or not to issue a new directive, or
maintain the current one.

4

the president is proposing4 and the general expected policy output) to the point where policy
output(s) may be observed once the bureaucracy has acted, a part of the process I refer to as the
5

distortion effect.

Such conditions are primarily driven by the level of presidential power, the
6

compatibility of the message, and resiliency of the bureaucracy. For example, if a bureaucracy
seeks to intervene by resisting the policy directive given by the executive, one would expect a
greater level of distortion between the policy directive and policy output.

Likewise, a

bureaucracy may actively seek to meet the policy directive, where the extent that a bureaucracy
seeks to meet a policy directive is how in this thesis I use the term bureaucratic responsiveness.

7

Section 1.3 offers a full discussion of each of these components and concludes with the
applicability of the model to future research.
Steps Three to Six: Testing and Evaluating the Model
Upon the development of the model, Chapter 2 of this thesis looks the test the model in
the case of the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn. This task
begins in Section 2.1 where I explain why the OIF to OND transition serves as a best-test case8
for the BEAR Model due to the clarity of the policy directive, the identification of a completed

4

I focus mainly on the explicit words provided by the president within a given directive rather than attempting to
investigate or speculate about presidential intent, which may at times differ from the president’s stated intentions. It
is appropriate to focus on the former as it constitutes the measure by which presidents are mainly appraised by
outside observers, including the media, the public, and other Washingtonians.
5 The distortion effect, discussed in depth later, includes intended distortions, which are a result of bureaucratic
resiliency and presidential power, and unintended distortions which may be a product of message compatibility.
6 External factors can also play a pivotal role in the distortion effect depending on the case-selected for study. This
BEAR Model is constructed to examine the transition from OIF to OND where the effects of external factors are
limited (see Section 2.1 for a discussion on why this is the case).
7 Bureaucratic responsiveness has been operationalized to examine different relationships in previous research, see
Section 1.2 for a discussion of the concept’s previous uses and why this is the definition used in the BEAR model.
8 By best test case, I mean to say a case for which the applicability and utility of the BEAR model is particularly
high, thereby providing an opportunity to clearly outline the manner in which the BEAR model may be applied to its
maximum potential. In conducting such a case analysis, I also make sure to point out and explain when and how
distortion can occur, even when conditions are ideally suited for maximum bureaucratic responsiveness. See Section
1.2 for a full discussion.

5

policy output, and the limited effects of external factors distorting the rhetoric-policy gap. Next,
in Section 2.2, I break down the literature that is pertinent for such case on foreign policy
directives and military bureaucratic responsiveness, including with respect to research on
national security policy development, the organizational-dynamics of the military bureaucracy,
and the president-military relationship. In Section 2.3, I conduct a case analysis using the BEAR
model, which primarily identifies the components of the model, as well as the implementation
process for employing the model.
In the conclusion of the thesis, found in Section 2.4, I discuss the utility of the BEAR
Model in the case analysis and propose future avenues of research. In the particular case of the
transition from OIF to OND, I find that the policy directive was clear, bureaucratic
responsiveness was high, and the rhetoric-policy gap was narrow as the distortion effect was
primarily a product of message compatibility. While data limitations existed within the case
study, the BEAR Model provided an adequate framework to assess the relationship between
presidential foreign policy objectives and military bureaucratic responsiveness.
1.2

THE EXECUTIVE-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP
While the rhetoric-policy gap has only been alluded to in previous works, many

components of the BEAR Model have connections with existing research. The model itself
formalizes and links the concepts found in research areas related to public-administration,
presidential, communication, and bureaucratic performance.

Considering the breadth and

richness of research in these fields, I divide the applicable literature used in this theoretical
framework into three sections: (1) the role presidential power plays in the policy process, (2) the
decision-making process of policy directives, and, lastly, (3) how bureaucratic performance and
responsiveness are assessed.
6

1.2.1 Presidential Power and the Policy Process
As the concept of the presidential power is central to the study of the American political
system, it is a topic that has been well studied and is often the subject of much debate,
particularly in the realm of determining (1) what presidential power is and (2) the effectiveness
of such power. As the BEAR model adopts a top-down approach9 to the policy implementation
process, I adopt the operationalization of presidential power vis-à-vis Neustadt’s (1960, 1990)
power as persuasion thesis, making the case that this method provides the greatest utility when
assessing the bureaucratic-executive relationship. In this section, I will discuss how I define
presidential power, how it has been expanding, and the role such power plays in directing
bureaucratic agencies.
What is Presidential Power?
The summer before his victory in the 1952 presidential election, General Dwight
Eisenhower, with his military background which encompassed his ability to order soldiers to
execute and follow orders, was in for a rude awakening. Speculating on how Eisenhower would
adjust to the presidency, then-President Truman reportedly stipulated that “He'll sit here and he'll
say, ‘Do this! Do that!’ And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won’t be a bit like the Army.
He’ll find it very frustrating” (Neustadt 1960, 1990).
The Truman perspective on presidential power limitations was famously noted and
expanded upon by Neustadt (1960, 1990) who argued that the president’s political power should
be examined beyond the context of legal and institutional frameworks because the president
operates in an environment where there are numerous independent actors and structural power
9

The top down approach is based on the starting point of analysis, where in the BEAR Model, the assessment
begins when the president provides a policy directive to the bureaucracy which must then be executed. This is
different than bottom up models which deal with the president responding to public demand or the bureaucracy
seeking to influence presidential decision-making.

7

bases that can limit the executive’s capabilities (see also Edwards 2000, 2009).

Therein,

Neustadt emphasizes that presidential power centers on a president’s ability to persuade the
public, Congress, other key Washingtonians, or bureaucratic actors as a means to achieve the
president’s policy goals. The study of presidential power using this thesis revolves around
studying the strategies, tactics, and options available to a president to generate certain policy and
political actions. In this regard, it is necessary to assess (1) whether the president is inherently
weak or strong (based on formal mandates, public opinion, the composition of Congress, etc.),
(2) the type of bargaining options available to him (such as veto power), and (3) presidential
power projections and limitations (such as utilizing a formalized process).
The difficulty with utilizing Neustadt’s power approach is twofold. First, it “specifies
little about how to measure concepts, test propositions, or analyze data” (Edwards 2000).
Second, the approach tends to emphasize actions and decisions made by a president from that of
the president’s perspective, which in turn, tends to neglect other elements of the political system
such as the state of the economy, the mood of the electorate, and Washington politics (Miroff
1980). Additional concerns arise over Neustadt’s view that leadership is based on a president’s
ability to bargain, whether in the context of “what is leadership” or in the components that make
up bargaining (See Hargrove 2001 for a full discussion).
These criticisms notwithstanding, Neustadt’s approach is ideally suited for the BEAR
Model as it is a top down model, where criticisms of the method emphasizing the presidential
perspective (Miroff, 1980) actually compliment the model as the directive is given from the
president and bureaucratic responsiveness is evaluated from such directive. Secondly, I consider

8

a president’s executive administrative authority10 to direct bureaucracies by determining if any
gap exists between policy directives and bureaucratic output and assessing the extent to which
the president is able to move the bureaucracy to carry out such directives.
Presidents Directing Bureaucracies
Beyond the Neustadt view that presidential power is the power to persuade, presidential
power has been seen as expanding in both an administrative and legal context. Laying out
eleven factors on how presidential power inevitably expands, including constitutional
indeterminacy and precedential effects of executive action, Marshall (2008) notes that part of the
expansion of presidential power is directly related to the expanding federal administrative
bureaucracy and, subsequently, how presidents have tried to control it.
The expanding bureaucracy has presented a dilemma for presidents as bureaucracies have
historically enjoyed a considerable amount of immunity from congressional, judicial, and
executive control, either as a result of indifference, information asymmetry, or lack of
constitutional clarity (see Benze 1985). This is amplified by the debate of “who controls the
bureaucracy,” between the competing parties of bureaucracy itself, the executive, and
Congress.11 The executive-bureaucratic relationship in particular has traditionally suffered from
constitutional ambiguity with regards to executive authority and a lack of institutional controls
which provides the bureaucracy “‘escape routes’ from presidential control” (Benze 1985, 773).
Even with these limitations, studies have shown that presidents have found ways to
influence and control bureaucratic institutions. Notably, most studies on presidential control of
bureaucratic institutions center on the specific constitutional constructs of the institution itself
10

By executive administrative authority, I refer to the president’s authority to direct bureaucrats within the
framework of the law, and regulatory authority as the generation of binding laws, a power derived from Congress,
which has also been called legislative control (see Rudaleviege 2009).
11 See Hammond and Knott (1996) for a discussion on role that these actors play in bureaucratic control.

9

and the delegated powers provided through presidential appointments. Moe (1985) laid the
groundwork for exploring presidential control of bureaucracies vis-à-vis centralization, or the
process by which bureaucratic policy development and decision making occurs under the
Executive Office of the President (EOP)—either in close proximity to (or directly within) the
White House, and politicization, for which presidents employ their appointment powers to place
political appointees in the outer executive bureaucracy. Studies on politicization tend to focus on
the process of political appointments, its effects on the bureaucratic makeup, and the
effectiveness of these politicized institutions where, for example, politicization can streamline
bureaucratic efficiency and political appointments can also be used as a tool of presidential
power in bargaining (Lewis, 2008). Centralization on the other hand, tends to be a structural
change of control and has been shown to fluctuate over time and by policy issue, despite
previous research indicating that centralization has increased over time (Rudalevige, 2002).
Further, current research seems to indicate that centralization and politicization are not
complimentary methods, but are substitutes in presidential strategy, a finding which has been
difficult to identify because of the complexity in measuring the concepts directly (Rudalevige
and Lewis, 2005). Though the BEAR Model adopts some components of this literature, many of
the complications noted in past works can be avoided in applying the model by virtue of its focus
on examining specific policy directives. For example, concerns raised by (Rudalevige, 2002) on
fluctuations of centralization by policy issue over time are not as pertinent when employing the
BEAR Model, which examines a particular policy over a period of time, rather than tracking the
total effects of centralization on a bureaucratic organization. Similarly, while the politicization
of a particular agency through appointments changes over time (see Rudalevige and Lewis

10

2005), there is minimal variation in such politicization within the bureaucratic agencies over
these periods since the BEAR Model is used for cases studies.
Despite the mixed effects seen in studies of politicization and centralization, and even
with the long tradition of bureaucratic immunity, recent literature suggests that presidents have
increasingly found new methods to utilize their administrative authority over bureaucracies to
advance presidential policy objectives. Utilizing more extreme measures of centralization and
politicization, administrations have taken steps to replace or develop new bureaucratic agencies,
exercised greater control over the budgetary process, and relocated more of the bureaucratic
processes within the EOP.12 As Kagan (2000) explains, using much of the framework laid out by
President Reagan, the control of the federal administrative bureaucracy expanded significantly
under the Clinton White House as it issued formal directives to the bureaucracy, delivered
executive orders on bureaucratic practices, mandated and or limited specific reporting of the
actions taken by agencies, and increased budgetary control through the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). In this regard, the constitutional ambiguity alluded to by Marshall (2008)
provides a grey area where presidents can administratively seek to increase their control of
bureaucratic agencies, a trend that continued under the George W. Bush White House.13 This
significant shift of presidential control amplifies the necessity to have an effective measure to
examine the rhetoric-policy gap as it provides a mechanism for the public, media, Congress, and
even the EOP and the bureaucracies to be able to assess the degree of distortion that occurs when
an agency attempting to meet a particular policy objective.

12

See Robert Maranto’s (1993) analysis of President Reagan’s relationship with the bureaucracy for examples of
these mechanisms in use, such as in employing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and utilizing the
Executive Office of the President (EOP) to control the budgetary process, or in examining President Kennedy’s
creation of the Peace Corps to circumvent the State Department in seeking out specific foreign policy ambitions.
13 Refer back to the Marshall (2008) article on expanding presidential power.
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1.2.2 Executive Decision Making
Before examining bureaucratic responsiveness to executive policy directives, it is
important to first unravel the components that make up such presidential policy objectives.
Presidential policy directives are developed through the decision-making process, which scholars
have examined at the psychological, individual, group, and structural levels. Further, a
significant amount of research has focused on the actors who seek to influence executive
decision making, including the media, the public, interest groups, Congress, and bureaucrats.14 In
this section, I first examine characteristics of the decision making process relevant to this
research before moving specifically to the bureaucratic-executive relationship where Allison’s
(1964, 1999) seminal work plays a significant role in the development of the BEAR Model.
Unraveling the Decision Making Process
The different pieces that make up decision making scholarship can be broadly placed into
three categories, identifying the decision itself, the models of the actors involved, and the
framework that actors operate in.15 While identifying a decision would appear to be relatively
straightforward, Langley et al. (1995) demonstrated the complexities of the topic as decisions
can vary depending on where the decision is made, if it is verbal or written, the nature of the
intent of such decision, and in the characteristic of a decision itself (e.g., is a decision a decision
if no subsequent actions are taken to its announcement?). While a full discussion on identifying
decisions (policy directives) is found in Section 1.3, suffice to say, in the BEAR Model context,
decisions are the actual terms and words provided by the executive in the form of speeches,
14

Pertinent literature on third party actors influencing executive decision making is found in the discussion of the
model itself in Section 1.3.
15 It should be noted that much of the terminology and theories found in the political science literature on decision
making is borrowed heavily from social psychology and economics, for which terms such as “bound-rationality”
and “utility” are adopted and applied in a political context.

12

written mandates, or executive orders, and the intent behind such directives are irrelevant in the
application of the Model.
Moving to a discussion of key actors and the framework they operate in, much of the
scholarship has circled around whether the individuals or the operating environment are the
primary forces which drive decisions. In the “three waves” of scholarship on the subject (see Art
1973; Farnham 1990), the first and third waves focused on individual actors calculating to ensure
their best outcome could be attained given the political context that the actors operated in.16 This
was done initially through examining individual beliefs in their utility functions (broadly called
rational choice theory), and later in a psychological perspective adopting the cognitive research
program (Farnham, 1990). Recent attempts have even been made to try and bridge the rational
choice and cognitive models through poliheurtic theory (e.g., Mintz 2004). While the role of the
individual is important in the context of Neustadt’s (1960, 1990) view of presidential power, the
BEAR model itself is more closely connected to the “second wave”, where the emphasis of
analysis lies more on the political system itself. In this perspective, the structure that the actors
operate in is considered a better predictor than the actors themselves as the structure sets the
“roles” that each of the actors plays (Farnham, 1990). One of the bigger names of the second
wave, Graham Allison (1964, 1999), identified key types of operating structures that influence
decision-making.
Bureaucratic Inputs in Presidential Decision-Making
Graham Allison’s (1964, 1999) seminal work sought to identify the process under which
executive-bureaucratic decision-making occurs and addressed some of the key components that
make up the interaction between the executive branch and bureaucratic agencies.
16

Allison

See Huntington (1961) and Neustadt (1960, 1990) and Stein and Tanter (1980) for examples of such literature.
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developed three models of analysis which he then applied to the decision-making that occurred
during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This included Allison’s primary and widely employed
rational actor model (or rational policy model), as well as the secondary alternative models: the
organizational process model and bureaucratic politics model. The rational policy model has
broad applicability for assessing actions taken by nation-states and demonstrates that actions are
taken based on state-level outputs as actors seek to maximize utility in their decision making.
Along with the rational policy model, Allison’s other two models further provide a
foundation towards developing a full framework of bureaucratic responsiveness to executive
policy shifts.

First, the bureaucratic politics model posits that a bureaucracy is not an

unconscious entity that simply executes policy objectives, but rather a conglomeration of
individuals in critical administrative positions who take part in a bargaining game and have their
own perceptions, priorities, and goals. In this model, it is important to note that presidential
administrations are also bargaining with the public. According to Allison, in responding to the
public’s desire for positive slogans, the Kennedy administration sought to clearly to distinguish
the differences between offensive and defensive weapons.

My model formalizes this

relationship by acknowledging that with public pressures on the president, an administration
must seek from bureaucratic entities a clarification of its proposed policy initiatives to ensure
that an administration can meet its goals in line with public demands. Simply put, the president
will rely on bureaucratic agencies to adapt to the rhetoric of the administration, regardless of any
differences between how intent or able the agency actors may be to immediately (and
substantively) respond to the president’s policy directives, how long substantive implementation
of the initiative may actually take, or the extent to which such implementation may fall in line
with public expectations.

14

Allison’s second model posits that the president is in charge of loosely allied
organizations. Here, a clearer view develops of how bureaucracies can constrain foreign policy
options. Identified as the organizational process model, decisions made by an administration
trigger organizational routines based on pre-existing procedures and practices, and are limited
based on the capacities of such bureaucracies.

Organizations typically formalize these

procedures through the use of standard operating procedures (SOPs), which determine how an
organization may effectively execute those tasks as actions and whether they are completed
simultaneously or sequentially throughout the bureaucracy to ensure that goals are met. This
doctrine of the organization is shaped by elements such as the allocation of resources, the
statuary authority, the culture of the organization, the process of internal bargaining, and the
institutional history which makes bureaucracies rigid and typically slow to adjust to rapid policy
shifts.

Additionally, these factors also influence the bureaucracy’s ability to meet policy

objectives and helps one determine how the organization views the measure of success or failure
in meeting those goals. Within a communicative context, additional disturbances can arise, as in
the case of the naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis where President Kennedy’s view
of the attributes of a blockade were different from that of the Navy, which generated a different
result than what the Kennedy administration had intended.17
While Allison focused on how bureaucratic outputs affected presidential decisionmaking, my model will assess how bureaucratic resiliency and capacity outputs affect the
bureaucracy’s ability to meet policy directives once the president has directed a change by
adopting the identified element of doctrine, SOPs, culture, and/or communicative disturbances.

17

The difference between the views of the executive and the bureaucracy on definition and concepts associated with
particular terms is part of the distortion effect, specifically unintended distortion, or the distortion that occurs as a
result of message incompatibility. See a further discussion in Section 1.3.
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1.2.3 Bureaucratic Performance and Responsiveness
Assessments of bureaucratic performance and responsiveness have varied with regards to
how scholars operationalize responsiveness, where the performance of the agency is based on
whom or what the agency is responding to. As Grace Saltzstein (1992) points out, despite the
increase of academic literature on the topic in reaction to presidential administrations having a
more direct role in controlling bureaucracies, there remains little consensus in the field on the
conceptualization or measuring of responsiveness, as well as in the theoretical components that
map out the relationship between the prominent actors involved.
Broadly

speaking,

the

varying

scholarly

conceptualizations

of

bureaucratic

responsiveness fall in relation to disagreements on the degree of independence that a bureaucracy
has and whether such agencies should be responsive to the public directly or to the state. For
example, in the public perspective, bureaucracies functioning within a democratic form of
government are argued to be responsive to the wishes of the public, either directly, or through the
directions given to the bureaucracy by elected officials. In this way, bureaucratic outputs should
respond the demands of the public, or the “consumer,” which can be measured by the level of
satisfaction that the public has of the output.18 This perspective differs from the state centric
view where bureaucracies are argued to be simply extensions (or “agents”) of the state itself,
where bureaucratic performance is more directly associated with the ability of the agency to
fulfill its mission rather than the preferences of the public or elected officials (Saltzstein, 1992).
Variations of each of these perspectives is based on the level of autonomy that the bureaucracy
itself is considered to have, such that a finding that a bureaucratic entity is “responding to the
public” may in fact be the result of the bureaucracy’s own internal values or its composition

18

See Sharp (1981) and Ostrom (1975) for examples of bureaucracies responsiveness to public demands.
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reflecting that of the public (e.g., Meier and O’Toole 2006).

In this way, performance is

typically directly related to the type of responsiveness that one is addressing.19
As the BEAR Model uses a top down approach, bureaucratic performance is assessed to
the degree that the bureaucracy has met a policy directive, and responsiveness is examined to the
extent that bureaucracy takes actions in an attempt to meet such directive. The distinction
between performance and responsiveness is a subtle one where performance is based on the size
of the rhetoric-policy gap at the completion of the bureaucratic output, while bureaucratic
responsiveness is the degree to which a bureaucracy takes steps to meet the policy objective (for
example: did the bureaucracy resist the directive or implement changes to meet the directive?).
1.3

THE BUREAUCRATIC-EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSIVENESS MODEL
While many of the key components to understanding the rhetoric-policy gap are present

in the general literature on the bureaucratic-executive relationship, and though there have been
various attempts and methods used to assess bureaucratic responsiveness, the need for a systemic
and full theoretical framework to more directly evaluate the difference between executive policy
directives and policy outputs remains. The framework of the BEAR Model compliments and
adopts into its structure some of the key findings made in the studies that use the decision
making models discussed by Allison in his seminal 1964 piece, as well as those studies that use
principle-agent theory in assessing the bureaucratic-executive relationship. In this section, I seek
to fill this gap in the literature by proposing the Bureaucratic-Executive Assessment of
Responsiveness (BEAR) Model for assessing bureaucratic responsiveness. In order to address
and construct the components of the model, this section is divided into three parts. In each part I
will expand on the overview provided in Section 1.1, highlighting how the various nodes interact
19

Performance components will be examined in Section 1.3 in the discussion of the BEAR Model.
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and how they are evaluated. Therein I first provide a method to assess the rhetoric-policy gap by
covering both the “Policy Directive and “Policy Output” nodes within the BEAR Model (see
Appendix A). Subsequently, I will discuss the method to assess bureaucratic responsiveness and
its effect on the rhetoric-policy gap by unraveling the components of the “Presidential Power,”
“Message Compatibility,” “Bureaucratic Resiliency,” and “External Factors” nodes. Lastly, I
will provide an analysis of BEAR Model and discuss its applicability in future research.
1.3.1 Rhetoric-Policy Gap
The starting point to unpacking the varying theoretical components of the rhetoric-policy
gap (RPG) begins with providing a basic definition within the context of this study. Simply put,
the rhetoric-policy gap is the difference between an executive’s policy directive and the
bureaucracy’s policy output20. This definition of the RPG is depicted below where Pe is the
policy directive given by the executive e, and O is the policy output as performed by the
bureaucracy b. In other words, it is an assessment of whether the rhetoric of the executive
concerning a certain policy directive set forth matches the reality of what actually happens at the
bureaucratic level, with the difference between the two denoting the “gap” between said
presidential rhetorical directive and bureaucratic output.
RPGp= Pe – Ob

(1)

The rhetoric-policy gap may be considered in two stages. First, one may consider the
initial or baseline gap between what the president proposes and the general expected policy
output. Once the president has delivered the policy directive, one can then apply the complete
BEAR model, which includes a consideration for the key conditions that may contribute to (and
20

In most cases, a policy shift would be required to observe a rhetoric-policy gap; however, if the new directive
requires no changes in bureaucratic action then no gap would be observed. Thus, while most directives are given
because they shift policy, it would be possible to find one that does not.
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thereby increase or decrease) the rhetoric-policy gap from the time the president proposes the
directive to the point where policy output(s) may be observed once the bureaucracy has acted, a
part of the process I refer to as the distortion effect. Therein, the distortion effect is composed to
two types of distortion, intended distortion and unintended distortion.
Intended distortion is a product of those actions taken by the executive, bureaucracy, or
third-party actors in seeking to intervene in the execution of a policy process, either to alter or
derail the intent of the president’s policy directive. Accordingly, if a bureaucracy seeks to
intervene by resisting the policy directive given by the executive, one would expect a greater
level of distortion between the policy directive and policy output. It is important to note that the
term intervene is used to identify an agent’s relationship with the policy process, meaning it is
when actors deliberately seek to alter the policy output after the policy directive is given. This is
different than those stipulated to in other decision-making models, where the actors seek to alter
the policy directive itself, a process that occurs prior to the point where this model begins.21
Unintended distortion occurs when the policy output does not occur in line with the
president’s policy directive, but for other unforeseen (non-deliberate) and/or practical reasons,
including a difference in bureaucratic interpretation of the terminology employed by the
president. For example, in Allison’s (1964) second model, he acknowledges that the intent of the
government did not necessarily translate to the direct actions taken by bureaucratic institutions,
which in his case, was the military. The reason for the disturbances was identified as a result of
organizational actions, such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), a lack of bureaucratic
flexibility, and general issues related to administrative feasibility. In Allison’s (1964) discussion
21

The decision making process concerns the manner in which actors determine what course of action to take,
typically based on inputs from other actors, environmental factors, and the individual preferences. The BEAR
Model begins after a decision is made, which is a policy directive. How a policy directive is developed, is based on
the decision making process, which makes the BEAR Model application unique, as it is designed to address the
actions that occur after directive is given.
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of the Cuban missile crisis, he notes that President Kennedy directed the Navy to conduct a
“blockade,” having very clear ideas of what he wanted the blockade to be and look like (the
desired policy output). While the Navy was able to execute a blockade, the actual design of the
blockade was different from what Kennedy had anticipated as it took the form of Naval SOPs.
While the policy directive was to set up a “blockade,” and the policy output was a “blockade,” a
rhetoric-policy gap still existed as a result of different interpretations of the terminology used in
the directive itself.
In this way, the terminology used in both the directive and the output are key to
assessing the rhetorical-policy gap, as the president and the bureaucrat may perceive the same
directives differently. While one may be tempted to identify the “intent” of the president in the
terms used for his directive, there is a level of unfeasibility in trying to determine individual
presidential intent across every case. Instead, one must look at the actual terms used and the
general associations employed with those terms because as presidents direct the bureaucracies,
they are simultaneously bargaining with the public and other players. For example, in Allison’s
(1964) Cuban missile crisis case, in responding to the public’s desire for positive slogans, the
Kennedy administration sought to clearly distinguish the differences between offensive and
defensive weapons, advocating that the bureaucracy find ways to introduce these terms in their
analysis.22
Regardless of whether the rhetoric-policy gap is a result of unintended or intended
distortion, the method of assessment proposed here only examines the extent of such RPG, based
on “policy directive” minus “policy output”—both of which I further discuss below.

22

A president directing a bureaucracy to adopt its use of terminology is part of the doctrine component of policy
directives (e.g., see the discussion on Bush requiring the adoption by the bureaucracy of its own definitions of
torture on page 48).
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Policy Directives
As the policy directive is the starting point for the BEAR Model and the assessment of
the rhetoric-policy gap, in this section I offer a discussion on what policy directives are, how to
select one for a case study, the differences between the types of objectives, and how to identify
the various possible components of a policy objective.
Executive policy directives are the outputs of the decision making process on policy
issues and thereafter serve as inputs for the relevant bureaucratic entities charged with
implementation.23 Directives can be proposed publically or privately and can come in the form
of policy speeches, written memos, verbal directions, or executive orders. Nested within each
directive are three primary components that must be considered: composition, doctrine, and
operations. Essentially, composition refers to the “whom” to which the directive is addressed,
doctrine concerns the “procedures” that are supposed to be followed, and operations denotes the
“action” that is supposed to be performed. While a directive may not contain each of these
components, it will have at least one.
Composition may be seen more specifically as the internal and external associations of a
bureaucracy comprised of the organizational structure and the tools available to each of the subbodies.

The organizational structure includes the design of the bureaucracy, the chain of

command, reporting configuring, and the breakdown the responsibilities of specific tasks. For
example, the Department of Labor has a Secretary of Labor at the head, a cabinet of advisors,
and directors of sub agencies, such as the Bureau of Labor and Statistics and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); with each sub-agency having its own leadership,

23

This is not say that decision making stops once a directive is given, as decision makers and relevant actors
continually assess the status of the implementation process and the results of agency outputs, but in the course of the
assessment, decision makers may choose to maintain the current directive or develop a new one in response to the
changing conditions (or emergence of new information) concerning the case.
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planning, and operating structure. Each of the different parts of the bureaucracy are responsible
for designated tasks and are typically outfitted with the tools conduct the such operations, like
having specialized equipment, staff, and the funding associated with such. Interactions between
the bureaucracy and its parts are the internal associations, but bureaucracies will also have
external associations associated with their responsibilities, such as reporting to Congress, the
EOP, the public, or to another bureaucratic entity. Executive policy directives may alter the
internal composition of the bureaucracy or the external associations that it may have. For
example, Executive Order 12291 issued by President Reagan required that federal agencies
would have to conduct a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and submit it to the OMB’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a directive of the composition by altering the
change of command for reporting (see Kagan 2000).24 Examples of internal composition in a
policy directive can come in the form of the actual designations of bureaucrats, such as the EOP
lifting the ban on combat roles for women in the Department of Defense (Brook and Michaels
2013), or the president may instead request a particular part of an agency to take on a mission.
A second component of policy directives is doctrine, which constitutes the formalized
directions that a bureaucratic agency follows in order to fulfill its tasks. Doctrine includes the
standard operating procedures (SOPs), the written manuals of policy implementation, and the
training of bureaucrats25 to meet the mission tasks. As noted by Alison (1964), considering the
size of bureaucratic agencies, where many actors perform multiple tasks in a particular sequence
or simultaneously, doctrine and SOPs are critical for operating efficiently and effectively.
Specifically, bureaucrats may refer back to doctrine to determine what specific actions to take.
While in select cases doctrine can be backed by regulatory authority (a law with set
24

Executive Order 12291 also centralized more control to the EOP, a component that fits the BEAR Model under
the presidential power node.
25 Often referred to as a process of “indoctrination” (externally) or socialization (internally).
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consequences), much of the material found in bureaucratic doctrine are used as guidelines, or fall
under administrative authority, where failures to follow doctrine may result in administrative
consequences (demotion, termination, relocation, additional training, etc.), but may not
necessarily have legal ramifications. This distinction is important, as doctrine does not mean that
those are the actions a bureaucracy must take, but more so the actions recommended or dictated
for a bureaucratic entity to take. Doctrinal components of policy directives are those that might
change the procedures an agency must perform as well as the training to be implemented, or can
offer new criteria for the terminology used by departments, such as the implementation of new
definitions for “torture” and “enhanced interrogation techniques” as occurred under the George
W. Bush administration through Executive Order 13440 and the relevant classified memos
(Crook 2007).
In a presidential policy directive, operations refer to the actual actions that the
bureaucracy is instructed to take, or the tangible tasks that a bureaucracy must perform (or
refrain from performing). Operations typically have an associated timeline, whether it is a finite
task, such as directing an agency to assist in a disaster relief effort that is considered completed
once the duties have been performed, or an enduring task, such as in conducting a Regulatory
Impact Analysis for a set of regulatory changes in accordance with a specified date or timeline.
Important in the analysis of composition, doctrine, and operations in the policy directive
stage of the BEAR Model is that a researcher identifies the expectations and associations with
the terms/words used in the directive. Expectations are not directly referring to the expectations
associated with the policy output (did it produce the result desired?), but more so the
expectations associated to the bureaucratic action. In order to avoid ambiguity, the BEAR Model
does not stipulate presidential intent or why a particular directive was given; rather the use of
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expectations and associations here is referring to the use of the terms/words used in the directive.
In the OIF to OND transition case discussed in Chapter 2, the president’s policy directive
instructed the military bureaucracy to cease all combat operations (operations), and to shift from
“combat forces” to “non-combat forces” (composition), and from a “combat” an “advise and
assist role” (doctrine). In this case, the assessment of expectations and associations is found in
the terms used, where there is an expectation that “non-combat forces” are different from
“combat forces,” and that “no combat operations” means that no forces will seek out and engage
in combat.26
How one unpacks the components of a policy directive may vary with each case studied,
as the directives themselves can vary in the degree of detail provided by the EOP. While
presidential scholars have invested interest in developing more nuanced classifications of policy
directives, the BEAR Model only requires a general categorization of policy specificity (see
Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: Policy Specificity

26

See Chapter 2 for a full discussion.
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Policy directives are categorized here as either specific or vague with respect to both the
policy details and the timeline provided. Again, while the BEAR Model does not address
presidential intent, the reasons for presidents to be vague or specific on policy directives are
varied. As Hale (1983) points out, presidential directives to bureaucracies can be intentionally
made vague to allow the bureaucracy to do what it desires in addressing an issue, even in the
case where it may be expected to do nothing at all (most likely when the president sets out a
directive for purely symbolic reasons)27. Accordingly, as presidents are continually bargaining
with the public and Congress, policy directives may be delivered in response to significant
events to demonstrate presidential action, but may remain vague in the case where a full policy
analysis on the issue may not have been completed. Alternatively, policies may be specific on
both policy details and timeline to help ensure compliance of the bureaucracy and/or as a means
to reinforce presidential responsiveness to a public demand.

In order to ensure uniform

classification, specific timeline instructions are those that include an exact date for compliance or
completion of an objective.28 Specificity on policy details occurs when the direct actions of the
bureaucracy are laid out by the EOP. For instance, a presidential directive for the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to improve regulations on greenhouse gases in the environment is
vague, while a directive to only allow new power plants to produce 1,000lbs of CO2 per
megawatt-hour would be specific. In this way, there may be degrees of specificity with respect
to both the policy details and timelines, thereby falling into one of the four general level
classifications.

27

In this way, a researcher can assess if a policy directive required an actual shift in policy. Part of such analysis
can also be performed within the context of the model, as an assessment of previous directives is examined in the
precedent subcomponent of the presidential power node (discussed in Section 1.3.2).
28 Compliance to an objective would be, for example, a directive stating that the Department of Agriculture must
conduct monthly drug testing of bureaucrats starting on x date, while completion of an objective might stipulate that
the Department of Agriculture will have all employees submit to a drug test by x date.
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Upon considering both the components of composition, doctrine, and operations, as well
as the specificity of policy directives, it is important to examine how such directives can be
selected for analysis using the BEAR Model. While the case presented in Chapter 2 is an
executive policy directive given publicly by the president to the bureaucracy, not all directives
will meet this format. Similar to the previous discussion of the president’s intent, presidential
administrations may choose to give tasks to bureaucrats privately or publicly and either through
the president directly, or through a cabinet or sub-cabinet position as depicted in Figure 1.3.
Reasons for such actions can vary, as the president may publicly announce a directive to the
bureaucracy in part to also influence the public, or can privately direct bureaucracy to fulfill a
policy objective without oversight. Likewise, the agent of the announcement can be a reflection
of presidential support of a policy objective, as observed recently in the Obama administration’s
efforts to lift the ban on combat roles for women in the Department of Defense—a directive
delivered publicly by then-Sectary of Defense Leon Panetta (EOP Directive/Public
Announcement), while the Obama White House policies on the use of drone strikes in the Global

Figure 1.3: Policy Announcements
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War on Terror (GWOT) was provided privately and under strict control of the president
(Presidential Directive/Private Announcement).29
Beyond policy announcements and policy details are the method that such policy is
delivered. Policies can be given in the form of EOP memos, Executive Orders (EOs), verbal
directions, or through bureaucratic signaling. Typically, EOs and bureaucratic signaling are
public announcements where EOs are available to the public (with or without an announcement),
while bureaucratic signaling occurs in policy speeches that have language intended for
bureaucrats (for examples on bureaucratic signaling, see Eshbaugh-Soha 2010).

Verbal

directions and EOP memos can be delivered either as public announcements or private memos,
which may constitute classified documents (depending on the issue addressed) for which verbal
directions may be given behind “closed doors.”
While the BEAR Model may direct scholars and practitioners to a wide range of research
questions concerning the differences between types of policy directives, announcements, and
their specificity, this is not to say the model is too broadly designed; rather, it is a reflection of a
gap in the literature that needs to be addressed and the BEAR Model’s potential generalizability
across varying cases. Therein, the BEAR Model offers a way to assess each of these components
and compare the differences in such characteristics in a systematic fashion. In the next section, I
propose a method to examine bureaucratic outputs and how such outputs should be compared to
the policy directives.
Policy Outputs and Assessing the Rhetoric-Policy Gap
While policy directives have expectations nested within the language presidents employ
in them, policy outputs are the actual actions taken by the bureaucracy. In this way, differences
29 See

Rohde (2012) for a discussion of the Obama administration’s drone policies.
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in policy directives based on the announcement agent, it being public or private, vague or
specific, do not apply to policy outputs, but rather the pertinent information on policy outputs are
found directly in the components of doctrine, composition, and operations (discussed above).
These components tend be of greater significance to bureaucracies as composition is the design
of the agency, doctrine the guidelines, and operations the actions.

Though not all policy

directives will make changes to all three components, bureaucracies will interpret policy
directives in relation to how they are designed for addressing a task (composition), the
procedures that have already been laid out (doctrine), and the experience derived from previous
actions (operations).
To capture the doctrine component of policy outputs, one may take the terms used in the
policy directive and asses each in relation to the doctrine of the bureaucracy. Essentially, one
may identify how the bureaucracy defines and uses terms. Using the Allison (1964) case, one
can identify the Navy’s (the directed bureaucracy) doctrinal definition of a “blockade” and the
subsequent standard operating procedures to conduct such. If a policy directive modifies the
doctrine, as in the case of President George W. Bush’s administrative classifications of torture
and enhanced interrogation techniques, one can then ascertain if the bureaucracies implemented
and adopted those definitions. Differences between expectations and actual changes in doctrine
are part of the rhetoric-policy gap. Note that if during the decision-making stage (outside of the
this model), the EOP receives a high degree of agency input before making a policy directive, the
executive can use greater specificity that matches the bureaucracies doctrine, thereby reducing
the rhetoric-policy gap.
With regards to composition assessments of policy outputs, one can perform such
assessments by identifying the actual bureaucrats performing a particular task and/or determining
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if the changes in reporting or chain of command structure were implemented. For example, if a
policy directive directs a particular agency to perform a task, such as the EOP directing the DoL
to have OSHA conduct new inspections, one must identify whether and to what extent that
agency performed the task or if it was delegated out to another sub-agency. Similarly, one might
ask: did the OSHA bureaucrats get attached to another department, and the bureaucracy claimed
that OSHA performed the inspections? Along with these considerations, if the policy directive
made structural or chain of command adjustments to the bureaucracy, examinations of
composition require one to inspect and determine whether the structural adjustments were in fact
made and if the reporting is being performed as directed.
In the same way, operations should be examined vis-à-vis observing whether concrete
actions are performed by the bureaucracy. While cases involving evaluation of the policy output
and the rhetoric-policy gap for operations may often be relatively straightforward, where, for
example, the EPA is directed to limit new power plants to 1,000 lbs of CO2 per megawatt-hour
(Walsh, 2012)30, the EPA allowing a new power plant producing 1,200 lbs of CO2 per megwatthour would be a rhetoric-policy gap in operations of 200 lbs of C02 per megawatt-hour.
Similarly, presidential direction given to the TSA to conduct biannual inspections of harbors can
be assessed if the TSA conducted inspections.

Still, critical to scrutinizing operations is

identifying if the policy directive has particular expectations of the operations themselves. For
example, in the case of TSA inspections, are the additional ordered inspections the same type of
inspections as previous implemented, or is the bureaucracy conducting minimal actions and
calling it “inspections”? In this way, it is important to determine the content of the operations

30

Note that in this case, the CO2 cap was the regulatory response to a presidential directive, but is provided here
more as an example of the degree of specificity that is possible.
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that the bureaucracy is conducting, and relate such to expectations of the policy directive in
assessing the rhetoric-policy gap.
As the rhetoric-policy gap is a static measurement (a single point in time), the type of
case and policy directive can guide the selection of when to apply the BEAR Model. In most
cases, policy directives are not completed instantaneously by the bureaucracy if it requires any
changes to operations, doctrine, or composition.31 In cases where action is required by the
bureaucracy, selecting the point in time to assess policy output and the rhetoric-policy gap will
depend on the policy directive. If a there is an enduring policy directive, the selection of the
point in time and application of the BEAR Model may be conducted in multiple iterations to
determine if changes in policy outputs have occurred over time. If a policy directive has a
specific timeline of completion, the model may be applied over the course of the timeline or
upon the specified completion date. For the transition from OIF to OND, there was a public
announcement that the policy directive was met, and was the natural selection point to assess
bureaucratic output and the rhetoric-policy gap. In this way, the individual cases will dictate the
times that which the BEAR Model can be applied.
Applicability of the Rhetoric-Policy Gap
While the rhetoric-policy gap in the BEAR Model provides researchers a guide to
determining the difference between the policy directives and policy outputs, it is important to
point out the limitations of the model. First, as policy directives have expectations, many
elements of the rhetoric-policy gap are difficult to quantify, particularly the components of
doctrine and composition. For example, how does one quantify a difference in the usage of a
31

Occasionally it is possible for a directive to be met instantaneously in cases where a bureaucracy is told to drop a
previous requirement or if the policy directive was used a presidential tool to publically reinforce an action that a
bureaucracy was already performing.
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term or variances in Standard Operating Procedures? Though the component of operations can
often be quantified, such as CO2 emissions, it is difficult to compare the rhetoric-policy gap
across different bureaucratic agencies, such as where a quantifiable figure of military troop levels
is difficult to equate to CO2 emissions. This limitation is not necessarily unique to the BEAR
Model but can still highlight the differences in the missions and actions of bureaucratic
institutions. In this way, the BEAR Model’s assessment of the rhetoric-policy gap lends itself
primarily to case studies. Still, the strength of the model is that it can be applied in iterations to
systematically assess particular policy directives or actions of a bureaucratic agency. Further,
the application of the full model offers methods to reduce the rhetoric-policy gap through
increasing and assessing bureaucratic responsiveness, which is the topic of the next section.
1.3.2 Bureaucratic Responsiveness
As identified in the review of the literature, many components necessary to assess
bureaucratic responsiveness have been previously addressed.

While these aforementioned

studies have tended to assess total bureaucratic responsiveness in response to inputs (such as
centralization, politicization, or public opinion), the BEAR Model is unique as it focuses on
individual policy directives and their policy outputs. In this way, I adopt much of the findings of
previous literature relevant to bureaucratic responsiveness and then apply it to the responsiveness
with respect to specific presidential policy directives.
Whereas a wide range of variables can impact bureaucratic responsiveness, in order to
develop a model that maintains parsimony, I divide the key factors of bureaucratic
responsiveness into four nodes: presidential power, message compatibility, bureaucratic
resiliency, and external factors. For the BEAR Model (see Appendix A), there are only two
arrows in the model, the first one moves from the policy directive to the four nodes of
31

bureaucratic responsiveness, while the other moves from the nodes of bureaucratic
responsiveness to the policy output. The first arrow from policy directive indicates that the
assessment of bureaucratic responsiveness begins after a policy directive is given by the EOP.
Once this directive is given, the four nodes of bureaucratic-responsiveness are all connected
without arrows, indicating that the actions that occur in these nodes can happen simultaneously
or even sequentially, depending on the case. This is to say that the nodes themselves and
components of each node can be related, where, for example, the level of presidential power can
overcome bureaucratic resiliency, or the centralization component may in some cases relate to
agency inputs. Based on the effects of these four nodes and their subcomponents, the second
arrow indicates that what occurs between the nodes of bureaucratic responsiveness generates the
policy output.
In order to assess bureaucratic-responsiveness, the BEAR Model offers nine propositions
about the general expectations of each of these components, allowing the research to maintain
falsifiability as each of the propositions can each be tested, replicated, and disproved. In the
following sections I will discuss each node and its subcomponents. In doing so, I will discuss
some of the key relationships between the varying components, as well as highlight
circumstances where there may be outliers that deviate from the propositions.
Presidential Power
After providing a policy directive to the bureaucracy, a power that falls within the EOP’s
administrative authority, the power of the president rests with one’s ability to persuade, bargain,
and influence the bureaucracy to perform the action (e.g., Neustadt 1960, 1990), and/or in one’s
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ability to centralize parts of the task under the EOP.32 In this section, I will discuss the relevance
of centralization to a policy directive and examine two components of presidential power; the
presidential mandate and policy precedent.
A mandate, broadly defined here, occurs when the beltway (Washington) and/or the
general public are substantially supportive of a particular action. Discussion in the previous
literature has centered on who can claim a mandate, how it is identified, the strength of
mandates, and, subsequently, whether they even exist (see Beckmann and Godfrey 2007). By
and large, mandates can either be based on public opinion or claimed be a result of an election.
For electoral mandates, presidents often have a limited window after elections (i.e., a
“honeymoon period”) where they are more effective in achieving policy success (Beckmann and
Godfrey 2007; Brody 1991). For those mandates based on public opinion, presidents can “ride
the wave” of the public outlook on a particular issue and take ownership of an idea
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994; see also Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). Before or after a
policy directive, a President can claim that he has a mandate on the particular action that the
bureaucracy is directed to perform. The implications of a presidential claim of a mandate are
depicted in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When the President claims a mandate on a policy directive, bureaucratic
responsiveness will likely increase.
Pertinent to the BEAR Model is that the president claims that a mandate exists for the
policy directive. When such claim is made (commonly as part of a public announcement) the
president is staking political capital to influence the bureaucracy into taking action. Regarding
this proposition, it is important to point out that not every case will have a mandate claim for a
particular policy, nor is it always required or expected for a bureaucracy to be responsive. In
32

See Section 1.2.1 for a full discussion on Presidential Power and how it applies to the BEAR Model.
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certain circumstances, a bureaucracy may not have any resistance to a directive and will be
responsive. Similarly, while there may be instances when a president claims that a mandate
exists when one does not33, a claim to such may still generally increase bureaucratic
responsiveness, though the effect of such may be limited. Nevertheless, because the president is
the most highly visible political figure, his/her actions in claiming a mandate can set the agenda,
as it will usually generate a responses from the media, other political officials, and the public.
While these responses may be positive or negative, the reference to the president’s claim of a
mandate highlights the issue in question. As noted in the discussion of policy directives, there
may be other announcement agents who can also claim a mandate on a particular issue.
Considering that these figures are less visible than the president, I do not stipulate here to any
additional expectations of bureaucratic responsiveness when other actors make claims of a
mandate, though a particular case may merit consideration of such additional actors and future
research may further explore such relationships.
The second component to the Presidential Power node in the BEAR Model is the
precedent of a policy directive. Precedent, or previous implementation of a comparable task or
directive, provides the groundwork to increase bureaucratic responsiveness to a policy directive.
Related to expanding presidential power, once a president directs a bureaucracy in a particular
way, subsequent presidents have greater capabilities to continue those previous actions, or to
even expand on such actions. For example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
evolved significantly since the Hoover White House as Nixon used the EOP to be a “counterbureaucracy” in looking to have greater control over the OMB, a precedent that Presidents
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Some scholars have even argued that a mandates do not exist (eg: Wolfinger, 1985), but the claim of a mandate is
what is analyzed in the BEAR Model as the president remains a highly visible figure and can often drive the agenda
on many issues.
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Ford, Carter, Bush, and Clinton continued to build on (see Kagan, 2000). This expectation of
precedent is reflected in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Generally, when a precedent has been set for a presidential policy directive,
bureaucratic responsiveness will likely increase.
As this proposition indicates, once a precedent is established, both the president and the
bureaucracy have the expectation that the president has the power to issue similar policy
directives and that the bureaucracy must respond. With such expectations, bureaucracies can
establish SOPs and resources dedicated to responding to such directives (if applicable), making
the bureaucracy more efficient to such changes. Still, even with precedent, bureaucracies can
resist particular policy directives as the president’s agenda may conflict with the political
makeup or the mandate of a particular agency.34 Beyond these cases, one can expect that having
precedent will generally increase bureaucratic responsiveness.

Likewise, for those policy

directives without precedent, one can generally expect a decrease in bureaucratic responsiveness
as a result of an agency being less prepared to take on a new task or by being averse to changes
in the executive-bureaucratic relationship.
The third component of presidential power in the BEAR Model is the ability of the
executive to centralize control over particular tasks. Simply defined, centralization is when the
functions of the bureaucracy are shifted to the EOP, or even more centrally within the White
House.

Centralization can take the shape of budgetary control, establishing reporting

requirements, necessitating that bureaucracies clear regulations through the EOP, or the EOP or
White House directly creating such regulations (Rudalevige and Lewis 2005) . For particular
policy objectives, the EOP may use centralization processes already establish by previous
administrations, or can establish centralization measures specific to the policy directive. As
34

See the “Bureaucratic Resiliency” section of the BEAR Model for example of such cases.
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discussed by Richard Nathan (1983), the power of centralization broadened rapidly under the
Nixon and Reagan White Houses, both taking steps to make an “administrative presidency,”
where many of the key decisions are made within the EOP. Examples include Nixon moving
control of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to dismantle Johnson’s War on Poverty35
and Reagan’s development of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to
increase control over bureaucratic spending.

The OEO and OIRA examples are those

centralization measures that had already been established, but it is also necessary to examine
whether specific centralization measures are included in new policy directives36. With these
considerations in mind, the expectations concerning centralization are described in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: Generally, when the President/EOP centralizes actions of the bureaucracy in a
policy directive, bureaucratic responsiveness will likely increase.
Whether the centralization is commanded reporting or requires the bureaucracy to have
its actions cleared by the EOP, the general expectation is that responsiveness will increase as
centralization obligates the bureaucracy to respond in some fashion. Further, as centralization
has transaction costs (where the EOP must delegate resources to manage new tasks), this signals
that the policy directive is important to the executive and this investment will typically lead to
the President and/or EOP putting more pressure on the bureaucracy the complete an action37.
While centralization is expected to typically increase responsiveness, it is important to point out
that, when it comes to policy topics with a high degree of complexity, centralization of
bureaucratic control can sometimes have the opposite effect, thereby increasing the rhetoric-

35

See also Benze (1985).
For example, Clinton required reporting by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) when he issued a policy
directive and used his executive authority to tighten controls on tobacco (Kagan, 2000).
37 See Rudalevige (2002) for a discussion on the transaction costs of the centralization process.
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policy gap, particularly as the EOP may lack the experience, training, and/or resources to
adequately meet the policy directive. In this way, the type of centralization action taken by the
executive can have differing effects on bureaucratic responsiveness, though generally one can
expect an increase in bureaucratic responsiveness.
Message Compatibility
The message that accompanies (and often embodies) a policy directive denotes a key
component for assessing bureaucratic responsiveness, particularly with respect to how
compatible said message is to a given bureaucratic entity’s expertise, structural capacity, and
overall consistency in rhetoric. In this section, I examine three subcomponents of the Message
Compatibility node: the degree of agency input in the executive of a policy objective, the
structural changes required for a bureaucracy to meet a task, and the level of consistency that the
message is delivered by the EOP.
The first component of message compatibility in the BEAR Model is the degree of input
provided by the bureaucratic agency is made evident by the details provided in the policy
directive. Agency input occurs when a president employs the expertise and resources of the
bureaucracy to aid in the development of the details of the actions that will be taken to complete
a task. Most research on agency input tends to focus on the benefits that it can have during the
decision making and policy development process, where for example it can enhance the
competence of a policy (see Campbell 1986), or can significantly increase the ability of the
president to push policy initiatives through Congress, with benefits that can outweigh upfront
managerial costs (Villalobos 2008, forthcoming). The BEAR Model varies slightly from this
previous research, as the applicability and benefits of agency input in this model focus more on
the point after a policy directive is given, rather than before. Though seemingly similar and
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often largely congruent, policy details can develop and change after a directive is given. For
example, in 1995 President Clinton publicly announced a six-step plan to reduce youth smoking,
directing the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take steps to stop the marketing, targeting,
and sales of tobacco products to minors. In nine months, the FDA in working with the EOP
provided a 921 page final ruling of the actual policy steps to be taken (Kagan 2000). In this case,
in carrying out the six-step plan, the bureaucracy had a high degree of information concerning
“how” the policy directive should be carried out once it was given. Accordingly, the general
expectations of agency are reflected in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Generally, the more a bureaucracy provides input on the details of a policy
directive, the more likely bureaucratic responsiveness will increase.
The reasoning behind such proposition is that when a bureaucracy provides input for the
actual process to carry out a directive, the agency more likely has a vested interest in executing
the task in accordance with its own preferences and capacity. Essentially, bureaucrats would be
more likely to be motivated since a failure to execute a policy directive could be construed as a
direct failure of the bureaucracy since it formulated the “how” for the implementation of said
directive.
The next component to message compatibility is based on the structural changes made to
the bureaucracy. I use the term structural changes here as pertaining to those changes which
require a bureaucracy to modify the way it executes its tasks. While generally new tasks could
be seen as a modification, what may be considered applicable in an assessment of bureaucratic
responsiveness are those tasks which require the altering of previous methods to execute policy
directives.

As identified by Wilson (1989), bureaucrats tend to resist rapid changes and

innovations that maximize uncertainty, preferring slow and predictable changes. Through SOPs,
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bureaucracies have set methods to execute tasks and if change is required to those predictable
structures, they may more likely be resisted by the bureaucracy. These considerations are
accounted for by the following proposition:
Proposition 5: Generally, if a policy directive makes structural changes to the bureaucracy,
bureaucratic responsiveness will likely decrease.
Structural changes to a bureaucracy can occur either directly, meaning those that are
explicitly part of a policy directive (such as consolidating bureaucracies under the Department of
Homeland Security), or as a byproduct of the mission task.

Structural change vis-à-vis a

byproduct of mission tasks occurs when the policy directive requires the restructuring of a
bureaucratic agency. For example, with the increase in peacekeeping operations required of the
military by presidential direction after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military had to alter
its structure to be formulated to take on smaller tasks by becoming brigade centric units as
opposed to a division centric ones (see Chapter Two for a full discussion). Typically, if a
bureaucracy is designed to complete a policy directive (such as the EPA performing new
inspections), there is no requirement change to structure, while if the message is incompatible to
how the organization is structured, bureaucratic responsiveness can decrease as a result of an
inability to rapidly adjust to meet the directive, or through an unwillingness to accept the
changes. In this way, structural changes have a connection to precedent, where if there is a
precedent for a particular policy directive, the bureaucracy tends to be better equipped to be
responsive.
The last component of the message compatibility node is the consistency of the policy
directive itself.

Consistency of a policy directive is based on two considerations: the

homogeneity of the EOP on a particular policy and the uniformity that a directive has with the
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bureaucracy’s terminology. Looking at EOP homogeneity first, it is when the key actors within
a Presidential administration privately and publically support the specific actions of a policy
directive. Essentially, one may consider the question: is the bureaucracy receiving similar
information on the expectations of a policy directive from the actors within the EOP? While
relatively intuitive, it is an important consideration where infighting in a presidential
administration can lead to a hesitancy of a bureaucracy entity to execute a policy directive. For
example, under President George W. Bush’s administration, policy directives to both the
Treasury and Defense Departments to guide U.S.-China relations were mixed as Paul O’Neill,
Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld (all key players in the EOP) provided
conflicting accounts of the expectations for such policy directives (see Adler 2009). Conflicting
messages to the bureaucracy can thus create hesitancy to executive a policy directive or can
increase the rhetoric-policy gap as a result of the bureaucracy selecting a directive inconsistent
with expectations that are not clearly defined. Conflicting messages can also come from a single
policy agent, where, for example, a president may publicly support a particular action taken by a
bureaucracy while privately opposing the measure to bureaucrats (or vise-versa). Regardless of
the agent, the general expectation is the same as a bureaucracy is receiving mixed messages from
the EOP. Such result is reflected in the following proposition:
Proposition 6: Generally, when the EOP is consistent in the message of a policy directive,
bureaucratic responsiveness will likely increase.
The second part of consistency concerns the uniformity that a directive has with the
bureaucracy’s terminology.

While this part does not warrant its own proposition, it is an

important component to consider when assessing the rhetoric-policy gap. At this juncture,
consistency refers to how the terminology of a policy directive translates to a bureaucratic
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agency. Essentially, does the bureaucracy view the terms of a directive the same way that the
executive does?

Though bureaucratic responsiveness is related to intended distortion (as

previously discussed), this subcomponent of message consistency more regularly relates to what
I refer to as unintended distortion. This subcomponent may not necessarily have an effect on
bureaucratic responsiveness, as a bureaucracy may execute a policy directive on how it uses the
terminology in its SOPs and doctrine, but can increase the rhetoric-policy gap if the executive
and the bureaucracy are using the same terms differently.38 Still, these differences can be
reduced through agency input during the decision-making stage which occurs before the BEAR
Model.
Bureaucratic Resiliency
The term bureaucratic resiliency is used to capture the concept of a bureaucracy’s legacy
and capability, both which form the basis for a bureaucracy to resist or carry out policy
directives. Where for example, a bureaucracy with a long legacy and an enormous amount of
resources would typically be better equipped to either complete or resist a policy directive, while
a new bureaucratic agency may lack the capability to perform the task, but could only put up
limited resistance to policy objectives. This is not to say that all bureaucracies will resist all
presidential directives, but there are certain policies which can increase bureaucratic resistance
leading to a reduction in bureaucratic responsiveness and increasing the rhetoric-policy gap. In
this section I examine three subcomponents of the bureaucratic resiliency node: the bureaucratic
mandate, the level of politicization of an agency, and the resources of the bureaucracy.
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Refer to in section 1.3.1 for a discussion on how the different views of the term “blockade” affected interactions
between the Kennedy Administration and the Navy.
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The first subcomponent of the bureaucratic resiliency node is the bureaucratic mandate
(or mission). Differing from the previous usage of the term mandate that applies to the public
and key Washingtonians in the beltway, a bureaucratic mandate is used here to describe the
institutional purpose of a bureaucratic institution.

Essentially, it entails what the mission

statement of the agency is. For example, OSHA’s mission is “to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for working men and women by setting and enforcing standards and by
providing training, outreach, education and assistance” (United States Department of Labor
2012). The agency’s design, culture, and doctrine are based on completing this task, where a
there is an evolution within the organization built through the process of this overarching mission
(see Payan 2001, 94-96). As a bureaucratic mandate is at the core of an agency’s actions, the
BEAR Model adopts the following proposition:
Proposition 7: Generally, the more a policy directive falls within a bureaucracy’s mandate,
bureaucratic responsiveness will likely increase.
An important scholarly contribution that addresses this component between the
bureaucracy’s mandate and bureaucratic responsiveness was identified by Tony Payan (2001) in
his analysis using bureaucratic and organizational models to highlight the differences between
the bureaucratic actions of “cops, diplomats, and soldiers” in the U.S. drug war. While most of
the literature indicates that bureaucracies inevitably want greater finances and resources, the
military resisted being part of the war on drugs, as “law enforcement activities” were not seen as
part of the military’s mission (Payan 2001, 195). As a result, the resources given to the military
to fight the war on drugs were allocated to items such as additional flying hours and radar
systems that were only supporting the drug war only in name, rather than action. Similar to the
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findings of Allison (1964), Payan (2001) is alluding to the rhetoric-policy gap, in this case, as a
result of a policy directive falling outside a bureaucratic mandate.39
The second component of the bureaucratic resiliency node is the politicization of a
bureaucratic agency. Much of the literature connects politicization (and centralization) as a part
of presidential power, where the president will make new appointments within the bureaucracy
in an attempt to achieve responsiveness. Circumstances such as changing between Republican
and Democratic administrations (and vice-versa) and having conflict with a bureaucracy tend to
increase the level of politicization by a president through common techniques such as
replacement, layering, adding, reducing the size of an agency, and through reorganization (see
Lewis 2008). Though these studies examine politicization as an act of presidential power in
response to events, what is pertinent to the BEAR Model is the level of politicization of the
agency at the time of a policy directive. Fundamentally, the political makeup of the agency at
the time the directive is given, as opposed to a presidential response of politicization to alter the
bureaucratic character. Unless there is an enduring policy directive, politicization would have
limited effects on bureaucratic responsiveness, as it would occur after the president was
unsatisfied with a result. Similar to centralization, politicization of a bureaucracy can sometimes
lead to an increase in the rhetoric-policy gap when the issue is widely complex and the political
appointees lack the necessary expertise to execute the task. Still, much of the literature indicates
that the more politicized a bureaucracy is, the more responsive it can be (see Lewis 2008),
specifically when certain criteria are met, at indicated by the following proposition:
Proposition 8: Generally, the more a bureaucracy is politicized by the President,
bureaucratic responsiveness will increase.
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Again, the direct contribution of the BEAR Model is that it offers a systematic method to assess both the rhetoricpolicy gap and offers a new avenue to determine bureaucratic responsiveness.
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This proposition indicates that a politicized bureaucracy increases bureaucratic
responsiveness as the president has “allies” within the bureaucracy itself. This effect tends be
limited to circumstances when those political actors were appointed by the current administration
or by a previous president who was like-minded on the policy issue. For example, a bureaucracy
that maintained a wide number of appointees by the Democrat would be more resistant of a
Republican president’s policy directive.

Though cross administration retention is rare, the

differences seen in bureaucratic agencies are more typically associated with the “pool of
appointees,” and tend fluctuate from administration to administration (Lewis 2008, 51-54).
Another consideration is how the mission of the bureaucracy attracts non-appointed bureaucrats
into the agency. Essentially, the mission of certain organizations may attract career bureaucrats
of a particular political makeup, and if such makeup differs from the current administration, one
can expect increased uses of politicization. Typically, Republican Presidents are known to use
politicization more than their Democratic counterparts (see Fesler, 1983). While there is a
relationship, for the sake of parsimony, I separate the level of politicization from that of the
mandate of a particular bureaucratic agency.
The final proposition offered in the BEAR Model relates to the level of resources that the
bureaucratic agency has in order to meet a particular case. Resources are the personnel, money,
specialization in training, and time that a bureaucracy has available to conduct actions. Time, in
particular, is a resource when assessing the rhetoric-policy gap, particularly when a policy
directive is given without a specified timeline. For example, if the president directs the military
to pull out all troops out of a country by tomorrow, if a rhetoric-policy gap assessment is made
the next day after the policy announcement, the expectation would be a sizeable rhetoric-policy
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gap as the bureaucracy did not have the resource of time to execute the task.

Similar

expectations are found will all resources as identified in the following proposition:
Proposition 9: Generally, the more resources that a bureaucracy has to meet the policy
objective, bureaucratic responsiveness will likely increase.
Though an obvious proposition, the resources of a bureaucracy may serve as an important
component for assessing bureaucratic responsiveness. Simply put, without resources to meet a
particular task, a bureaucracy cannot be responsive.40 Likewise, the level of resources required
by a bureaucratic agency to meet a policy directive will depend on the policy directive itself,
where for example, some directives may only require minimal resources if the directive is to add
to or to remove existing regulations. While the actual funding of the budgets of bureaucratic
agencies is executed through Congress, new policy directives may not always require additional
funding, particularly when there is a precedent for the policy directive, and as such, the
bureaucracy may have already allocated resources in expectation of a policy change. Similarly,
if the budgetary process of a particular bureaucracy has been centralized by a presidential
administration, funds may have been requested from a bureaucracies’ budget in preparation of
issuing a policy directive. Further, the policy directives may instruct a bureaucratic entity where
and how much to pull from its budget to execute a particular task.41
External Factors
While the BEAR Model focuses primarily on the executive-bureaucratic relationship, it is
important to identify those external factors which can also condition bureaucratic responsiveness.
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In some cases, where a policy directive has limited practicability, meaning that it directs the bureaucracy to
complete a task when it is not feasible, one cannot always conclude that bureaucracy was not responsive, but simply
that the rhetoric-policy gap was a result of the policy directive being unrealistic in the expectations it sets forth.
41 Provided that the directed changes in the use of funds have not been restricted by congressional legislative
authority, this can occur where such variations in budgetary restrictions differ on a case by case basis.
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In particular, presidents, Congress, and the judiciary are often considered the “political masters”
of bureaucracies (Niskanen 1971; Payan 2001). In this regard, here I examine the effects that
Congress and the judiciary can have on bureaucratic responsiveness, along with the effects of a
number of key environmental factors. Most of these external factors tend to condition the
relationship between the executive and the bureaucracy, where Congress and the judiciary can
sometimes set the parameters of environment (i.e., what directives are legal, not legal, etc.).
Overall, the extent of such factors having an effect on bureaucratic responsiveness will vary
depending on the particular case of study, which is why no propositions are offered in this
particular section. Instead, I offer some considerations for researchers to examine as it may
apply to their case of study.
The first consideration of external factors on bureaucratic responsiveness is the effect of
Congress, which is often seen as a key player in maintaining bureaucratic control. Similar to the
executive-bureaucratic relationship, Congress can attempt to centralize some components of the
bureaucracy through requiring the agency to report to Congress, by establishing congressional
oversight of regulations and policy implementation, and most importantly, by having the
Congress use the power of the purse. As previously indicated in the resource subcomponent of
the bureaucratic responsiveness node, depending on the policy directive itself, circumstances
may provide opportunities for Congress to prevent from a bureaucracy being responsive to a
policy directive. For example, while one of President Obama’s first directives to the military and
subsequent agencies was to close the prison base in Guantanamo Bay Cuba, the Congress pulled
all funding related to the action, preventing the bureaucracy from responding (Espo, 2009). In
such cases, the Congress can attempt to intervene in the EOP directing a bureaucracy in a
particular fashion, though this power is somewhat limited if there is an establish precedent of the
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policy directive. Generally, one can expect that if a president has the support of Congress,
bureaucratic responsiveness can increase.
One consideration on why the BEAR Model does not offer general propositions on
Congress, beyond the variation of policy objectives as mentioned above, is that primarily, if the
Congress intervenes in a president’s ability to issue a directive or alter the legal framework that a
bureaucracy operates in, they are essentially issuing a new policy directive to the bureaucratic
institution, which is outside the scope of the BEAR Model as it assess the executive-bureaucratic
relationship.
Though cutting funding is an example of the Congress intervening in the process itself,
another consideration is that Congress can issue legislation that is consistent with a president’s
policy directive, which then adds legal authority to such directive.

This consideration is

identified in the BEAR Model (see Appendix A) in the compliance reference under the judiciary
subcomponent of external factors, indicating that Congress can make laws which then allow the
judiciary to ensure bureaucratic compliance. For example, under the Nixon administration, the
President wanted the EPA to increase regulatory standards on air pollution. With support of the
Congress, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 allowed citizens to sue both the polluters and
the EPA, which increased overall bureaucratic responsiveness as the EPA had further obligations
to follow both the President’s and the legislative’s directives under threat of judicial compliance
(see Smith 2005 for a full discussion). Further studies have shown that Congress can create laws
that ensure that bureaucratic agencies meet the requirements under the purview of judicial action
(Smith, 2006). While both congressional and judicial action can play role in bureaucratic
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responsiveness, the applicability in the BEAR Model is limited as these actions will often alter
the policy directive, rather than being reflective of the level of bureaucratic responsiveness42.
Certain cases of study will require researchers to examine environmental factors and their
effect on bureaucratic responsiveness. Although the type of environmental factors will vary by
case, the two that warrant discussion here are public pressure and external non-state and state
actors. The public and public interest groups regularly serve as lynch pin in democratic regimes.
Generally, the public plays a pivotal role in the decision making process of elected officials, and
can sometimes drive policy preferences of both the Congress and the president. Studies that look
at public opinion on policy issues as well as election results tend to be bottom-up models, where
such studies are examining presidential and congressional responsiveness to public views (e.g.,
Rottinghaus 2006). Still, it is important to look at the public’s role in the top down BEAR
Model, where public pressure is related to the strength of a presidential mandate as well as can
drive policy directive specificity. Considering that the BEAR Model begins after a policy
directive is given, public pressure can be important in cases where the public is aware of specific
policy directives and are monitoring the success of the bureaucratic output. If for instance, the
president issued a directive but the bureaucracy has not closed the general expectations of such,
the public may pressure the president to use other methods at their disposal, such as
centralization or claiming a mandate to put pressure on the bureaucracy to respond.
External state and non-state actors may also play a role in certain cases of study,
particularly those where a president is directing a bureaucratic institution to alter its doctrine.
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The BEAR Model is used to assess bureaucratic responsiveness to executive policy objectives, focusing on the
executive-bureaucratic relationship. This is not to say that bureaucracies cannot be directed by Congress, or be
under the scrutiny of judiciary, but these other actors only apply in the BEAR Model when they condition the
relationship. An instance where the bureaucracy stops performing a policy directive based on a new directive (from
Congress, for example) would signify the stopping point of the BEAR model as it is used as a tool to investigate
responsiveness to specific executive policy directives. For such cases where a researcher is looking at how multiple
actors seek to direct a bureaucracy simultaneously, principal-agent theory may be a more appropriate framework to
apply.
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For example, as previously discussed, the implementation of new definitions for “torture” and
“enhanced interrogation techniques” as occurred under the George W. Bush administration was
in part a response to external state and IGO pressure for the United States to be in compliance
with the Geneva Convention and other external obligations (Crook 2007). Likewise, state actors
may seek to pressure bureaucracies and the EOP when a particular policy directive takes place
overseas, such as foreign aid funding or State Department and Department of Defense actions.
In this way, the EOP may respond by adding more pressure on a bureaucratic institution to meet
the policy directive.
While the Congress, the judiciary, the public, and external actors can all play a role in
bureaucratic responsiveness, many of these external factors play a stronger role in the decision
making process that occurs before a policy directive is given. Also, in the case of Congress and
the judiciary, these actors may alter the policy directive itself, which is outside the context of the
BEAR Model. Still, the external factors node is necessary to include in the BEAR Model as
certain cases of study will require a consideration of their effect on bureaucratic responsiveness.
1.4 ASSESSING THE BEAR MODEL
In observing current research on the bureaucratic-executive relationship, it was found that
there remained a notable gap in the literature with regards to assessing bureaucratic
responsiveness to specific policy directives as well as there being a lack of an established method
for determining the level of the rhetoric-policy gap. Building upon current research on these
topics, the construction of the BEAR Model offers a full theoretical framework to examine both
these phenomenon in a systematic and replicable fashion.
Within the investigation of the rhetoric-policy gap, the BEAR Model provides some
theoretical criteria to account for the differences in policy directives through observing the
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variations that can occur with regards to announcement agents, the level of details provided in
the directive, and the differences between public and private announcements.

Using the

subcomponents of doctrine, composition, and operations, researchers can identify both the
expectations of the policy directive as well as the actual output of the bureaucracy in determining
the rhetoric-policy gap. In using this framework, both researchers and policy makers will have
the tools to more directly and purposefully assess the impact of particular policy directives in one
measure as well as over time. While across agency assessments can be limited, using the same
method of evaluation can highlight the differences between bureaucratic agencies.
In assessing bureaucratic responsiveness to policy output, the BEAR Model is divided
into four nodes: presidential power, message compatibility, bureaucratic resiliency, and external
factors. In the first three nodes, nine propositions have been provided to identify the general
expectations of each subcomponent, much of which has been investigated in peripheral research.
Each of these propositions can be tested and evaluated, and while I would expect future studies
will confirm this model, I have also identified the relationships between some of the
subcomponents as well as some of the possible “outliers” that researchers may encounter.
Within the external factors, though not an exhaustive list of possible factors which may interfere
in bureaucratic responsiveness, the role of Congress, the judiciary, the public, and state and nonstate actors was discussed with regards to possible circumstances that may arise in the models
application in case-studies.
With the identification of how the BEAR Model fits into the literature and upon the
construction of the full theoretical framework, the next step is to test and refine the BEAR
Model. In the following Chapter, I offer an example of the application of the BEAR Model in
examining the case of the military transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New
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Dawn in Iraq in order to highlight how the model can be used, tested, and refined in future
studies.

51

Chapter 2: Operation Iraqi Freed to New Dawn
On August 18th 2010, millions of Americans watched as soldiers exchanged hugs and
high fives as the United States Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, leaving from Iraq,
crossed over the Kuwaiti border. Relaying the message from the Pentagon, news agencies
reported that this latest withdrawal of approximately 14,000 U.S. soldiers represented the last of
U.S. Combat troops to leave Iraq, a message emphasized by the White House website displaying
the title “End of Combat in Iraq” (White House, 2010). The full withdraw was reported in an
official capacity on September 1st 2010 when President Barack Obama identified that there had
been a full shift in U.S. policy as he announced that the American combat mission in Iraq had
ended in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Armed Forces Agreement and that Operation New Dawn
(OND) had replaced Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as the new standard for military actions in
Iraq. Public opinion surveys conducted during that month asked respondents to assess the “result
of the war with Iraq” and were often framed in a manner where the respondents are “looking
back” with only 16% of surveys providing questions to assess the public perception of the 50,000
U.S. troops that stayed in Iraq as part of Operation New Dawn. While the 50,000 troops that
remained were only a third of the monthly average force levels which peaked in 2008 at 157,800,
the number of troops was only 17,000 less than the 67,700 monthly averages during the invasion
year in 2003 (Congressional Research Service 2009). Even as the Pentagon identified the troops
that remained from August 2010 until the full withdrawal in December of 2011 as “advisors” to
the Iraqi Security Forces, there were 66 deaths—35 of those Killed in Action—and 301
Wounded in Action during Operation New Dawn (Department of Defense Reports 2012).
Despite the significant shift in the executive’s policy directive, which laid out the military’s new
role during Operation New Dawn, the question remained: Did the direct changes taken by the
52

military in Iraq reflect the policy change calling for an end of combat operations? Similarly,
were the rhetorical changes projected by the presidential administration an accurate description
of what occurred on the ground?
While current research has addressed peripheral questions, few have tackled the critical
component of determining the relationship, responsiveness, and communication differences
between the executive branch and the military bureaucracy in order to unravel the elements of
the above noted research questions. As mentioned previously, studies have thus far covered a
wide variety of topics, including the organizational dynamics of the military bureaucracy, the
effectiveness of military operations, how presidential rhetorical strategies influence the public
agenda in foreign affairs, and, in turn, how public opinion influences presidential foreign policy
decision-making. However, despite these advances, there remains a notable gap in the literature
with respect to the relationship between presidential foreign policy objectives and military
bureaucratic responsiveness. In particular, when presidents use rhetoric to introduce key shifts in
foreign policy directives, to what extent can subsequent actions taken by the military reflect real
policy change? To date, scholars have yet to thoroughly examine the connection between
foreign policy shifts in presidential rhetoric and the extent to which the military is able to
effectively transform its operations to meet such executive policy directives.
In this chapter, I apply the Bureaucratic-Executive Assessment of Responsiveness
(BEAR) Model to the 2011 U.S. transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New
Dawn in order to determine the level of bureaucratic responsiveness and the level of the rhetoricpolicy gap. In doing so, I aim to determine if the four nodes of bureaucratic responsiveness can
adequately explain the rhetoric-policy gap found in this case. In order to address these tasks, this
chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will address why the transition from OIF to OND is
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a best-test case for an initial test of a BEAR Model. Next, I will discuss why the BEAR Model is
an appropriate theoretical framework for the puzzle of military transitions, and identify
additional those components in the BEAR model that are unique to this case. Third, I will use
the model to examine the rhetoric-policy gap and look at each of the nodes offered in the
theoretical framework. Last, I will offer a conclusion on both the OIF to OND case, as well as
on the broader utility of the BEAR Model. Overall, I find that while the case presented has
limitations on data availability, the BEAR Model offered a strong framework to investigate the
rhetoric-policy gap and the role of bureaucratic responsiveness.
2.1 BEST-TEST CASE SELECTION
To test the utility of BEAR Model for assessing bureaucratic responsiveness to executive
policy shifts, I selected the 2011 U.S. transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New
Dawn as a “best test” case scenario because it provides clarity regarding the following critical
elements: (1) there was a public announcement of the initial presidential policy directive and,
later on, a follow-up announcement that the policy directive had been met, thereby providing
observable start and end points, (2) a president has the greatest power in foreign policy, and (3)
the military bureaucracy has clear but limited avenues of resisting policy directives. As such, the
use of a best test case scenario in this case analysis is done to demonstrate how the model
functions and may serve as a baseline that researchers and policy makers can use to explore other
cases concerning bureaucratic responsiveness to the executive.
There were a number of important factors that I considered in choosing the case of the
2011 U.S. transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn to assess
bureaucratic responsiveness. First, presidential power is most visible in the realm of national
security and foreign affairs where the president’s role has been notably expanding in recent
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years. In particular, given an abdication of power on the part of the U.S. Congress (see Fisher
1995, 2000), it is no longer uncommon for a president to unilaterally decided to enter into a
conflict and can in some cases, “out maneuver” Congress to pursue foreign policy objectives
(Marshall, 2008). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of presidents to perform these actions still
depends on their ability to persuade the public, as presidents have been increasingly held
responsible for their successes and failures in foreign affairs (Hill 1998; Fischer 1995, 2000;
Voeten and Brewer 2006; Sirin and Villalobos 2011). In this regard, presidents have more
authority, but also more potential accountability for their decision-making. Since the conditions
allow the president to have the greatest level of influence over the direction of foreign policy, a
presidential policy directive on a national security and foreign affairs issues is an ideal candidate
for testing the proposed model.
While it is the president’s role to execute the laws of the United States by, in large part,
directing a wide range of bureaucratic agencies, the military bureaucracy in particular lends itself
to a greater level of presidential influence and bureaucratic responsiveness given that the
president is designated as Commander in Chief of the military (see Desch 2001 for a discussion
on military being responsive to civilian authority). Given this structural designation to have the
military subservient to civilian authority and with the complex nature of conflict, militaries tend
to develop a culture which places an emphasis on a soldier’s ability to follow and execute orders
in a top-down hierarchical decision making context (See Osiel 2001 for a discussion on the
context that soldiers follow orders). While following orders is necessary, engaging in conflict
can lead to complex and ambiguous situations where a degree of flexibility is necessary for a
commander to complete a mission. The concept of commander’s intent was formalized in the
1982 U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 to provide the framework for commanders to be able to
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have the freedom to act in the “fog of war.” Based on the German army’s concept of Afragastik,
or mission-oriented command, commander’s intent requires that subordinate commanders
understand the desired military end state (or goal) of their higher command, that then allows
those commanders to adjust their actions when unforeseen circumstances arise so long as such
action meets the intent of their higher command (Vego 2010; Shattuck 2000). These elements
enable a military bureaucracy to be more responsive to presidential policy shifts and sensitive to
the intent of the president when directing policy changes.
I selected the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn in
particular because it represents a case where President Obama had a public mandate to execute a
change, a military bureaucracy that was open to the new directive, and the policy shift was
introduced with strong, clear rhetoric, signaling presidential intent. The basis of this stipulation
was grounded, in part, by examining the Obama transition into the White House, the
environment that administration inherited, and in the initiation of policy change.

These

conditions additionally provide information on bureaucratic inputs and presidential decisionmaking, as well as shed light on the president’s ability to influence the military bureaucracy.
The application of the BEAR Model to examine the executive-military bureaucracy relationship
is the topic of the next section.
2.2 NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY
Although most executive-bureaucratic interactions will have their own distinct
characteristics that condition the association, the relationship between the executive branch and
the military lends itself as particular unique case of study. The reason for this variation is
threefold; first, while the president has gradually assumed greater control of other government
bureaucracies, the military is one of the few cases where the president is explicitly directed to sit
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atop the agency as Commander and Chief. Secondly, considering the risks associated with the
military becoming involved in the political process, military culture places an emphasis on
following orders, but is distinct in its rules and regulations and is typically more immune to
politicization and centralization.

Lastly, as many actions of military (e.g., conducting

intervention and war) effects international affairs, the role of external state and non-state actors
tends to be more prominent than with other executive-bureaucratic relationships. In this section,
I begin by discussing broadly the research that is applicable to military interventions like
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn. Next, I will demonstrate how the BEAR
Model can be used in this literature and identify the additional considerations that should be
made when using the BEAR Model to examine executive-military bureaucratic relationships.
2.2.1 The Theoretical Puzzles of Military Interventions
Examinations of the topic of democracies and war have either had international,
domestic, or military centric connotations.

Concerning international effects, studies have

focused on differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes based on their ability to
bargain based on normative, structural, or domestic institutional constraints, such as their
likelihood and ability to fight and win wars rapidly (Putnam 1988; Voten and Brewer 2006).
Domestic studies have been based on analyzing the particulars of constraints, whether it would
be the role of the media in reporting and portraying war (see Regan 1994; see also Baum 2003)
or presidential policy responsiveness to constituents based on war perceptions (Larson, 1996).
While military studies fall within the constructs of the community itself, particularly to refine the
military craft, the examination of the tactics and strategies implemented has recently captured a
growing field of academic studies (for example see, Palka et al. 2005). Still, the relationship
between that of the military and the executive is often an overlooked phenomenon that can
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arguably be traced to the military being constitutionally subservient to the democratic
government. With few inquiries into the topic, there arise two possible findings that require
examination. First, if there is no disconnect between an executive’s dictated orders of what
military policy should be and the changes made by the military bureaucracy to meet such policy,
there should be no identified anomalies for the actions taken on the ground, regardless of their
effectiveness. The alternative being that if there exists a disconnect between the executive and
the military bureaucracy, one would expect to find modifications between the dictated policy and
the direct actions taken, or as the BEAR Model identifies, a rhetoric-policy gap. Here, I first
look at the international implications of the military and war, based primarily on democratic
peace studies, before moving to how the literature examines the domestic actors in the decision
to go to use military force.
2.2.2 Democracies and War
Within the study of democracies and war, much of the academic debate has circulated
around democratic peace theory.43 Stemming from Kant’s seminal work Perpetual Peace,
scholars have continued to develop the empirical evidence concerning the probability of peace
and democratic dyads (Russet and Oneal, 2001; Russet et. al 1998; Bremer 1992; Ray 1995).
While as close to an empirical fact as there can be in the social sciences (i.e., that democratic
dyads do not go to war with one another), the theoretical reasons behind such an anomaly
remains a point of scholarly contestation (Levy 2002). In the debate concerning the reasons for
peace between democracies, explanations offered have ranged from social indicators, such as the
majorities view that war is socially unacceptable (Doyle 1983), that the social cost is incurred by
43

While the BEAR Model does not directly address international conflict and the differences between regime types,
the discussion on democracies and war are considered here as scholars have noted that democracies have domestic
constraints (Levy, 1988), and, given the international context of military actions/interventions, this context should be
accounted for in the external factors node for such cases.

58

all parties and therefore less likely (Dixon et al. 1994), or from economic indicators, taking into
consideration that the cost/benefit incurred by the aggregate is economically feasible.
Regardless of economic or social reasoning’s presented, the common thread is the added element
of domestic indicators in foreign policy decision making. This gap between domestic issues and
international decision making has been addressed at some levels by liberalization theory, which
takes on three primary assumptions: (1) that rational individuals and private groups who promote
their

interests are the primary actors in international politics, (2) that states and political

institutions represent the domestic interest of their constituents, and (3) that the internal features
of the state shape the actions taken in the international system (Moravcsik 2006, 161-165).
Essentially, representatives and negotiators have to take in account their political survival in
addressing policy decisions (Mayer 1998), with more developed constraints on democratic
regimes than dictatorships as identified by Putnam (1988).
Domestic Constraints in Democratic Regimes
The internal processes that occur within democracies are based on the executive’s
responsibility for foreign policy decision making, such as the decision to go to war, the media’s
role in reporting and shaping public perceptions, and the public’s view and responsiveness to the
war. In the United States, foreign affairs successes and failures have increasingly been attributed
to the President as the executive branch of government has consolidated power from the
Congress in such affairs (Hill 1998; Fischer 1995, 2000; Sirin and Villalobos 2011). In this
regard, the President as Commander-in-Chief is held accountable, not only by elections for the
decisions made, but through the perception of foreign policy success as seen in presidential
approval ratings (Voeten and Brewer 2006). With the consequences of political missteps in
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foreign affairs being especially high, the decision to go forward with war by an executive is often
more greatly weighed than those of leaders of authoritarian regimes.
Public evaluations of success or failure in war are passed through the filter of the media
and entertainment outlets, where the manipulation of symbols, glorification of force, and
economic impact of the military industrial complex can influence the willingness of such
population to support military interventions (see Regan, 1998; Baum, 2003). Within role of the
media in framing the issues of war, there lies an underlying necessity for the executive to use
rhetoric to influence the media as most of the population receives their information cues and
political information from such. While the media does have a social impact, much of the
evidence concerning military interventions identifies that the length of an intervention and more
significantly, the number casualties, directly affects the public’s support of military operations
(Mueller 1973; Gartner 1998; Sirin 2011). Further, the public’s support for conducting military
interventions has been demonstrated to significantly depend on the level of association with the
targeted state, through either economic interdependence or through the level commonality on
perceived political issues (Bennett and Paeltz 1994; Maoz and Russet 1993).
Summarizing the literature discussed above, a conceptualization of the dominant processes in
military interventions is found in Figure 2.1.44 While there are other actors and relationships in
the study of interventions45, this figure focuses on some of the key components. Starting with
the “Military Bureaucracy” box in Figure 2.1, the arrow to “Military Intervention” indicates the
military is the primary actor in military interventions, and research on how the military conducts
interventions tends to focus on the practical applications to military professionals. This
44

This figure is not intended to pose a full theoretical framework, instead it is offered here to identify where in the
literature that the BEAR model can be utilized to study the executive-military bureaucratic relationship.
45 Much of the literature on the topic of conflict is not limited to military interventions as the research covers
military disputes, military interventions, interstate war, and peacekeeping operations. The term “military
intervention” falls in line with my focus on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as examined herein.
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Figure 2.1: The Military Intervention Process
research lies primarily in the field of military science, which revolves around the strategies,
tactics, and actions taken by the military to achieve success in an intervention. In the “Military
Intervention” box is where the literature addresses the differences between regime types as well
as the reasons that states engage in military interventions. Domestically, based on the military’s
actions in a particular intervention, the media can shape the public’s perceptions of the military
intervention itself, as indicated from the “Media” observing the military intervention, and
reporting to the “Public.” The public, based on inputs from the media, and dominantly, from the
level of casualties that have been attributed to the military intervention itself, will then hold the
executive accountable. Based on the inputs of the public and an assessment of the military
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intervention, the executive can then issue a new policy directive to the military bureaucracy.46
The use of the BEAR Model falls in this gap, where the executive is directing the military
bureaucracy to take a particular action (a top-down approach).

Previous research on the

relationship between executive and the military bureaucracy has tended to focus on the decision
making process itself, where key actors in the military play a role in developing national security
policies (see for example, Sarkesian et. al 2008; Allison 1964), or have looked to apply
bureaucratic politics and organizational models to more deeply examine bureaucratic actions, but
tend to focus on the internal characteristics of such (e.g., Payan 2001). While all these studies
have provided insight into the relationship, the BEAR Model offers a direct focus on assessing if
the policy output meets the policy directive. Specifically, was the presidential announcement of
the “end of combat operations” an accurate description of what occurred?
2.2.3 The BEAR Model Applied to Executive-Military Bureaucratic Relationship
While the BEAR Model provides the broad theoretical framework to examine executivebureaucratic relationships, some consideration is required to apply it to military bureaucracies,
and specifically, to cases of military interventions.47 There are two important dynamics unique
to military bureaucracies which are part of the centralization and politicization sub-components
of the “presidential power” and “bureaucratic resiliency” nodes in the BEAR Model (see
appendix B). Also, additional attention must be paid to the role that state and non-state actors
play in military interventions, as identified in the “external factor” node. I will address each of
these considerations in turn.
46

The directions offered in this conceptualization should not be adopted as a formal model as more actors and
relationships are at work than those identified. For example, the executive also seeks to influence both the media
and the public, and the public receives information on the executive from the media. The military bureaucracy, the
media, the public, pressure groups, Congress, and the like can all play a role in the decision making process of the
executive, which is not reflected here.
47 See Chapter 1 for a full discussion of the BEAR Model.
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The military is often considered as designed to be subservient to the civilian authority,
but at the same time is offered some insulation from politicization and centralization to ensure
that the military does not become a political entity capable of threatening democratic and even
non-democratic regimes alike (see Desch 2001; Feaver 1996; Burk 2002). For example, in the
realm of military appointments, only high level General, Admirals, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
heads of commands are appointed by the President, but these appointments are primarily based
on the recommendations of the military establishment and Congress (see Isaacson 2001).
Similarly, lower level officer positions are often performed in “batches”, or lists of names,
through the Senate on behalf of the president, but the nomination process is maintained within
the military establishment with its own codes and regulations. With these limitations on a
president to politicize the military bureaucracy, in order to maintain a level of civilian control
over the military, there are set positions and processes which the president has access to,
meaning that the level of centralization and politicization will rarely vary in the application of
the BEAR Model for these subcomponents; instead, they are set in the established national
security policy process.
The military, as it is an instrument of national security, is part of the broader national
security establishment. Studies on the national security establishment, examine the relationship
between national interest (ranging from defense of the homeland to dealing with abroad threats
to establishing favorable conditions overseas), and national security (or the ability to meet and
prioritize these interest).48

Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala (2008) offer a thorough

investigation into the U.S. National Security process and identify the “four major power clusters
within the U.S. command structure” which are: (1) the policy triad (secretary state, secretary of
defense, and the national security advisor), (2) the director of national intelligence and the
48

See Lord (1994) and Kegley and Wittkopf (2006) for a full discussion.
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chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, (3) the president’s closest advisors and chief of staff, and
(4) the secretary of Homeland Security. These various power clusters demonstrate the breadth of
considerations that are taken in the development of national security policy, and while limited
politicization is possible, the president appoints key positions (such as the secretary of defense,
national security advisor, etc.), that sit atop these agencies and provides some level of
centralization for the process to ensure a degree of presidential control over the security
establishment. Still, research on the interaction between these power clusters, and the changing
national interests and national security policies, tends to focus on the development of policy
directives, which, aforementioned, is the starting point of the BEAR Model. In this case, the
BEAR Model compliments studies on national security policy as one can use previous works to
examine how policy directives are made and then can use the BEAR Model to then examine how
such policies get implemented.
Another consideration of the military being linked to national security policy and interest
is the effect that non-state and state actors can have in the policy implementation process of the
military establishment.

For example, in the OIF to OND case discussed in Section 2.3,

considerations to end combat operations were based on authorizations to conduct operations that
were established by the United Nations Security Council, the Security of Armed Forces
Agreement between Iraq and the United States, and even more broadly, U.S. commitments to
NATO in Afghanistan. While many of these actors and agreements impact the shaping of a
policy directive itself (the decision making process prior to the BEAR Model), they can
condition the relationship between the executive and the military bureaucracy, as these external
commitments can pressure the president to pressure the bureaucracy to comply with the policy

64

objectives.49 In most cases where the military establishment is directed to take actions overseas,
international agreements, organizations, and alternate states can play a role in conditioning the
policy implementation process, similar to the role that congress and the judiciary can play in
domestic bureaucratic cases of study. With the unique characteristics identified for military
interventions, it is now time to investigate the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to
Operation New Dawn.
2.3 TRANSITIONING FROM OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM TO OPERATION NEW DAWN
The first unrestricted discussion of the policy directive of Operation Iraqi Freedom began
with a public announcement from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chief of
Staff, Gen. Richard Meyers on 21 March, 2003. In the announcement, Secretary Rumsfeld and
General Meyers identified the objectives of OIF, which were: to dismantle the Saddam regime,
capture or destroy all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, kill or capture any terrorist that had
been provided safe haven, and make way for a new democratic Iraqi regime (Department of
Defense 2003). With the total of coalition forces over 180,000 strong, the primary ground
invasion force that began OIF the day before the DOD announcement, on March 20th, consisted
of the V Corps (75,000 soldiers), the 1st Military Expedition Force (35,000), and the 3rd Infantry
Division (19,000).50 Forty-two days later, after the capture of Baghdad and the iconic toppling
of Saddam’s statue, President George W. Bush made is infamous “Mission Accomplished”

49

To emphasize a previous point discussed in Section 1.3, it should be noted that examining how external actors
may interfere with the success of the operation is not a consideration of the BEAR Model. For example, in the 1993
Battle of Mogadishu, U.S. military forces faced resistance in the attempt to capture Mohamed Aidid, but the BEAR
Model focuses on examining if the military was responsive to the policy directive, meaning did the military take
action to meet the policy directive, and while a gap may exist, the BEAR Model does not offer evaluation criteria if
the desired outcome of the directive was successful or not, only the size of the rhetoric-policy gap itself (see
footnote 3).
50 See Palka, Galgano, and Corson (2005) for background information on the invasion force and on the policy
announcements.
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speech on 1 May, 2003, where he declared that all major combat operations in Iraq and ended
(White House 2003). In the six years that followed that announcement, President Bush never
reiterated that combat operations had ended, as the war became increasingly unpopular due to the
financial cost and the mounting casualties, which indicated to the public that the mission had not
been accomplished on that day of the Bush announcement. The next Presidential announcement
that declared that combat operations had ended came in Obama’s presidential address to the
public about the completion of the shift to Operation New Dawn on August 18th 2010.
In this section, I apply the BEAR Model to the OIF/OND transition, beginning with
Obama issuing a policy directive to the military bureaucracy to begin actions to switch to
OND51. First, I will look at the rhetoric-policy gap by examining the policy directive and the
policy output. I will then assess the level of bureaucratic responsiveness that led to such
rhetoric-policy gap by using the BEAR Model nodes and its propositions for the general
expectations of each subcomponent.
2.3.1 The Rhetoric-Policy Gap of the OIF to OND Transition
The first step to assessing the rhetoric-policy gap in the BEAR Model is to determine the
evaluation points, beginning with when the policy directive was given then determining where
the end point will be for the application of the model. Here, I first look at the policy directive
itself, identifying the directives expectations in modifying the composition, doctrine, and
operations, followed by an assessment of the same subcomponents of the actual policy output in
order to determine the rhetoric-policy gap for the case.

51

While the policy directive was for the military as a whole, the BEAR Model in this case focuses on the U.S.
Army as they represented the largest contingent of military forces in Iraq while other branches, such as the Marines,
had been substantially shifted over to the Afghanistan conflict before the Operation New Dawn transition (See
Shanker 2007 for background on the Marine’s request to be moved to Afghanistan and United Press 2009 for the
Marine withdrawal timeline).
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Policy Directive
Displayed prominently on the White House website on issues is a section titled “Promise
Kept,” which provides a timeline of the Obama administration’s actions in regards to Iraq (White
House 2011). In the timeline, the key dates of the large actions for the administration’s policies
on Iraq are laid out; beginning with Obama’s inauguration speech that include comments on Iraq
on January 20th, 2009, the direction he provided to his national security team to begin the plan
for withdraw on his first full day of office, the public announcement of the plan of withdraw of
military forces from Iraq on February 27th 2009, and, lastly, the announcement of the
completion of the Operation New Dawn transition on August 31, 2010.
The issuing of the policy directive on the President’s first day of office was made as a
private announcement by President Obama. While details of the private announcement were not
made public until Obama’s first speech on Iraq on February 27, 2009, it is generally indicated
that the message was to identify a clear plan to withdraw from Iraq, largely based on Obama’s
prior statements and his op-ed piece in the New York Times where he laid out his general plan for
Iraq (Obama, 2008). Considering that there was limited specificity on policy details and only a
general timeline provided, the public announcement in his first speech on Iraq made by the
President in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, is a better starting point to apply the BEAR Model,
as the speech had both a specific timeline as well as more substantial policy details. Still, the
initial private announcement must be considered, as the public announcement was simply a
formal and more detailed policy directive than that of the private announcement. In the Camp
Lejeune speech, President Obama identified three goals he had for issuing the policy directive to
the U.S. military: (1) that combat missions in Iraq will end, (2) that all combat brigades would
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exit the country and that only an advise and assist force would remain52, and (3) and that the
mission will shift from combat operations to supporting the Iraqi government (White House
2008).53 All these actions were to be completed by August 31, 2010 (a specific timeline), a
message that was emphasized on that date when the President again made a public
announcement that all three goals of the policy directive were met.54
In this issuing of the public policy statement, Obama particularly emphasized the term
“combat,” which was repeatedly used in the language of the objectives as there was an ending of
combat operations, removing of combat brigades, and shifting from combat operations to
stability operations. The term “combat” induces the concept that has been often called the
“American way of war,” which is based on four dimensions: (1) that Americans view a distinct
difference between peace and war, (2) that Americans view conflict in a conventional/legalistic
manner, (3) that Americans tend to be skeptical of the use of U.S. ground combat forces, and (4)
that U.S. involvement must be terminated as quickly as possible (see Sarkesian et. al 2008 for a
full discussion). While certainly the lines between war and peace have been increasingly blurred
for most Americans since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11, Obama uses
language that specifically appeals to the American view of war, indicating that this policy
directive is a distinct shift from combat to non-combat operations and forces. Considering that
the general perceptions Americans display about the concept of war are primarily influenced by
images, movies, propaganda, and news sources (see Haridakis et al. 2008 and Snow 2003 for the
role that these sources play in shaping American views of war), the term “combat forces” elicits
52

The “advise and assist” verbiage comes from the August 31, 2010 speech, but is indicated in the initial public
announcement.
53 The Camp Lejeune speech also included policy directives for the State Department to engage Iraq and the
surrounding states to develop a regional framework of diplomacy and dialogue, a topic not discussed here, but one
that may serve as another case of study and case for the application of the BEAR Model.
54 The specific timeline, the public announcement of the policy directive and the that the directive was met, is why
the OIF to OND transition is a best test case, as the case has clear dates where the BEAR Model can be applied.
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images of the hardened grunt soldiers as portrayed in movies like Black Hawk Down, Saving
Private Ryan, and the Hurt Locker, while “advisors” tends to invoke the idea of bureaucrats
sitting at meetings offering views on how missions should be conducted. Similarly, “no combat
operations” denotes that the forces that remain do not actively seek out and engage the enemy
and that the advisors are not placed into positions from which they can regularly be targeted by
enemy military forces. While public perception is not clearly the primary criteria for assessing
expectations of a policy objective, the strong use of the terms and distinctions from combat and
non-combat forces indicates that the policy directive had an expectation of a distinct change from
war to peace. Here, I will use the three subcomponents of operations, doctrine, and composition,
to examine the expectations of this policy objective.
Beginning with the subcomponent of composition under the policy directive node of the
BEAR Model, it is important to examine if the directive dictated changes to the “who” conducts
the task in the military bureaucracy. As noted in the second objective laid out in the Camp
Lejeune speech, President Obama directed that all “combat brigades” were to exit the country by
August 31, 2010 and the remaining “transitional force” of U.S. troops were to work in the
capacity of “advising and assisting” (White House 2009, 2010).

While no organizational

structure was dictated, the directive indicates that there is a substantial difference in the design of
the combat brigades and the remaining transitional force. As indicated in the above discussion of
perceptions of combat forces, the use of the term “combat brigades” indicates that the military
force prior to the implementation of the policy directive was a force which was designed to
conduct kinetic fighting operations against the enemy, while the transitional force was to serve
simply as a supporting role, such as planning and providing intelligence to Iraqi Army and police
forces. Thus, the expectation for the subcomponent of composition is that the forces after the

69

completion of the policy directive were to be distinctly situated for advising, and not to conduct
combat operations.
Moving to the subcomponents of doctrine and operations, the President directed that
military bureaucracy shift from combat to advise and assist operations. As indicated in the Camp
Lejeune speech, President Obama emphasized that the long-term solution in Iraq must be
political in nature, rather than through the use of military force. With the 18 month timeline laid
out for the “safe and secure” withdrawal of all combat forces, the remaining forces were there to
serve in a supporting role to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The transitional force was to
conduct “three distinct functions; training, equipping and advising Iraqi Security Forces,” which
included supporting counter-terrorism missions and “protecting civilian and military efforts
within Iraq” (White House 2009). The functions of training, equipping, and advising all provide
emphasis to the non-combat capacity that remaining 35,000-50,000 military forces would serve
after the 31 August deadline, accentuating that military forces would not conduct kinetic combat
operations. Doctrinally, the policy directive specifies the type of operations that the transitional
forces could conduct and identifies the use of terms that the military should use in its doctrine.
Policy Output
To assess the rhetoric-policy gap, the next step is to identify the ending point of policy
output. The OIF to OND transition case lends itself particularly well to identify a key point in
which to apply the BEAR Model as the President made a public announcement stating that the
transition was complete on August 31, 2010.

As previously identified, this announcement

reiterated the Camp Lejeune speech, stating that the policy objectives had been met, that all
combat forces were out of Iraq, and the combat mission in Iraq was over. In this particular case,
I apply the BEAR Model to examine this date, as it was the President concluding that the
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objectives had been met. Still, it is important to note that by applying the model to this date, not
all components of the operations subcomponent can be captured, as combat operations still could
have been taking place up until the August 31st deadline. While I will discuss some of the
operational actions that occurred after the August 31st deadline, an additional application of the
BEAR Model would be warranted to account for the 50,000 troops that remained in Iraq to
determine the type of operations that they were conducting. Instead, here I focus primarily on
the doctrinal and composition subcomponents of the policy output to examine the rhetoric-policy
gap at the deadline set by the Obama White House.
Based on the expectations of the policy directive that all combat brigades were out of Iraq
by August 31st deadline, the remaining transitional force must be examined to determine if such
expectations were met, which is part of the composition subcomponent of policy outputs. At the
deadline, there were 50,000 U.S. military forces still deployed to Iraq, and the military classified
these brigades as Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs), as opposed to Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs), which were in Iraq prior to the deadline. While a discussion of the development of the
BCT system is included in the structural subcomponent of the message compatibility node in
section 2.3.2, it is important to examine some of the differences between BCTs and AABs.
After the Iraqi invasion, with the U.S. military’s initial marching orders to defeat the Iraqi
military forces and the subsequent successful toppling of the Saddam Hussein’s regime, political,
economic, and social factors drove the country to instability and an insurgency developed, which
challenged the U.S. military and the Iraqi Security Forces. As the traditional military design was
not suited to conduct a supporting role to third party military forces, like the Iraqi Security
Forces, the military developed Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and Stability Transition Teams
(STT), which were designed off of a Special Forces composition, whose role was to train foreign
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forces (Morschauser 2010). The MiTT and STT were composed of 10-16 personnel who would
be specialized training forces in security operations, like military police operations, and would
then be imbedded into Iraqi units. Using this model on a much larger scale, the military
developed a modular structure composition, as the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was originally
designed, and called it the Brigade Combat Team-Stability (BCT-S).

The BCT-S was a

“designed” BCT that was augmented with additional units such as Civil Affairs Teams,
engineers, military police, etc., to meet the end state of the mission (United States Field Manual
3-07.1 2009). While the initial BCT-S were deployed to Iraq in early 2009, during the August
31st transition, all the Brigade Combat Teams that were in Iraq that day were simply renamed
Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) (Brannen 2010). With the BCT-S being a modified combat
force, the renaming of these brigades did not constitute real change as it arguably was just a way
for the military to meet the condition of no combat troops in Iraq. For example, the composition
for a Stryker BCT is depicted in Figure 2.2, which is the set composition for such BCTs that
occurred prior to the transition to Operation New Dawn (other BCTs, such as the Heavy BCT,
have a similar composition). The BCT-S (later named the AAB), which was used in Iraq as
early as 2006, had the composition depicted in Figure 2.2, with the attachments of MiTT, STT,
and Civil Affairs teams (CAs), typically under the Brigade HQ Company, or the HQ Company. 55
For example, the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, which was the “last of the combat troops,”
had identical composition to the 2-25 SBCT, renamed to 2-25 AAB, which remained in Iraq as a
part of the 50,000 advisors.

As reported in the Army Field Manual 3-21.11, a SBCT

organization is primarily composed of infantry battalions, with a “mission… to close with and
55

Civil Affair teams provide support to military units by through working with the civilian populations and
authority within a units area of operation. While more heavily used in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency
operations where the population is critical to mission success, CAs have also been used in more kinetic, combat
operating environments (see U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57, 2011). Also, it should be noted that MiTT and STT units
were not always attached to U.S. Army units, as some were directly attached and supported by Iraqi Army units.
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Figure 2.2: SBCT Composition56
destroy or defeat enemy forces within the full spectrum of modern combat operations” (United
States Army Field Manual 3-21.11 2006, 18). While the brigade’s modular structure allowed the
integration of civil affairs and MiTT teams to be a part of the unit, the 2-25 AAB was by design,
primarily a combat unit. Other units that remained included the 1-1 HBCT, renamed 1-1 AAB
after Operation New Dawn took effect, and 1-1 AAB, which was an augmented version of 1-1
IBCT, an Infantry combat brigade. These units, along with the other Advise and Assist Brigades
still had equipment such as the M-1 Abrahams tanks, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles,
Stryker combat vehicles, predator UAV’s armed with Hellfire missiles, etc. Essentially, the
remaining units had access to the same combat power prior to the change to Operation New
Dawn, but were now armed with a different name, “advisors”. This change was not a change in
compositions of units, as the composition was simply a modified BCT, but a reflection of the
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Figure 2.1 is from Lieutenant Colonel Rick. Taylor’s 2013 article titled “Logistics Risk in the Stryker Brigade
Combat Team.”
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military altering the names to meet the mission end-state. Still, considerations must be made
about the mission change, which is addressed in the doctrinal subcomponent.
While the actual composition of the units that remained changed very little, the mission
itself dictates the classification of such units. In order to address this issue, it is important to look
at the military doctrine itself, the training required to meet the new mission, and examine the
practical difference in its uses. Addressing mission change, which officially was reported as
moving from combat operations to stability operations, it is important to examine the context in
which stability operations has developed. Based on the guidance of Sectary Defense Donald
Rumsfeld’s 2001 concept, the military has adopted a concept of “full spectrum operations”
which seeks for military forces to have the ability to shift from offensive, defensive, and stability
operations as required (Gonzales 2001). The ability to shift from offensive operations to stability
operations was another reason why the military shifted to the modular Brigade Combat Teams.
Examining the military doctrine of Stability Operations in Field Manual 3-07, the integration of
stability operations can be a “complement and reinforce offensive, defensive, and support
operations, or they may be the decisive operation. They may take place before, during, and after
offensive, defensive, and support operations.” Doctrinally, stability operations are integrated
with the offensive combat operations on the full spectrum scale and as such, pre- and postOperation New Dawn operations had limited distinguishing characteristics. This spectrum of
conflict is depicted in Figure 2.3, which is from the “Training for Full Spectrum Operations”
Field Manual 3-07. This figure displays the spectrum of conflict (from stable peace to general
war) and the operational themes that occur within full spectrum operations.

The type of

operations is determined by the “aim point,” as indicated by the oval on Figure 2.3, which can

74

capture different operational themes as it moves across the spectrum of conflict. For example
different themes can require the dominate use stability operations (bottom left of the figure),
while offensive (combat) and defensive operations can be a small component of conducting such
operations, while in other cases, offensive combat operations can be the dominate focus
(depicted in the bottom right of the figure). In regards to the OIF/OND transition, doctrinally the
aim point is shifted to the left of the spectrum of conflict, where stability operations are the
dominate type of operations conducted.

Figure 2.3: Full Spectrum Operations57

57

Figure 2.3 is from U.S. Field Manual 7-0 (2008), 1-7.
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Taken from the Center for Army Lessons Learned about the early military struggles in
Iraq, the military determined that the exclusive use of kinetic operations, or combat operations,
would not work in a counterinsurgency environment (Gonzales, 2011). Hence, the military
decided that it would shift towards stability operations as a part of the full spectrum design as the
conflict continued. Doctrinally, stability operations has a broad range of possibilities available
to military forces as there are SOPs which address humanitarian, counter-drug, peace, foreign
internal defense, combatting terrorism, displays of force, arms control, and security assistance
missions (United States Field Manual 3-07 2008). While Iraq was predominately a foreign
internal defense mission, the military did incorporate a counter insurgency strategy that required
U.S. forces to focus on developing Iraq national stability by winning over the populace through
construction and service projects while developing stricter requirements on the military
personnel’s use of force.58 Despite these changes, under the doctrine of full spectrum operations,
units could still shift into offensive operations when the circumstances that justified it such arose.
For perspective, while the intent of doctrine is different when shifting towards stability
operations on the full spectrum scale, it still does not represent significant change in military
policy to reflect the executive’s end state. For example, a unit conducting a “combat operation”
can patrol a particular district of a city seeking to identify and destroy hostile enemy forces,
while a unit of identical composition can conduct a “stability operation” by patrolling the same
district of a city in a display force to get the population to believe in the effectiveness of military
forces. Regardless of the intent differences in these two military operations, if engaged by an
enemy force, both of these forces would conduct the same battle drills, such as react to contact,
where a decision is made to maneuver away or fix the enemy so that they can be destroyed.

58

Which in part, was the adoption of the MiTT and STT teams in the military composition of BCT-S, and later what
was renamed AABs.
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These battle drills, as they are apart the “core war-fighting skills”, were the primary focus of unit
training pre- and post- Operation New Dawn as dictated by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff
who directed that training for the “advice and assist mission” should still be centered on the
ability of the BCT-S to be able to conduct offensive/defensive operations (Morschauser 2010).
Essentially, the military training for stability operations, consisted of the regular training prior to
Operation New Dawn, but was supplemented by military courses that discussed Iraqi culturalawareness, language training, and methods to work with Iraqi national forces. The training
element to military operations was similar to that of the examination of military composition, the
training had not changed, and it was simply augmented with additional elements to meet military
operations. While there are distinct differences between combat or offensive missions when
compared to stability operations from a military practitioners perspective, in comparison to the
distinct differences as proposed in the policy directive, it has been demonstrated that they both
fall under the full spectrum doctrine, which is committed to allow the flexibility for military units
to transfer from one type of operation to another. Hence, while there was a change in the
mission intent to avoid conducting combat operations, as for the doctrinal differences, the
statement of “no more combat operations” reflects the military bureaucracy moving to meet the
policy directive, but still contributes to the rhetoric-policy gap.
Despite the rhetoric-policy gap found in both composition and doctrine, the
subcomponent of operations is the important factor in meeting the rhetoric-policy gap as it is the
how the AABs used the doctrine to conduct the policy directives objectives of training,
equipping and advising the Iraqi Security Forces.59 While this application of the BEAR Model is
set to examine up to the date of completion of the policy objective, I will offer several notes on
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For example, while doctrine allows the flexibility of the military to conduct operations that do not necessarily
meet such objectives, the military could still in fact make efforts to comply with the expectations.
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the operations that occurred after the August 31st deadline to the full troop withdraw that
occurred on December 18th, 2011 (Arango and Schmidt, 2011). Even though U.S. military
operations and actions still remained classified, there are several indicators which can be
examined. First, looking at casualty reports, while there have been over 66 total deaths since
OND, 38 of which were KIA (result of hostile action), from August 2010 to the end of December
2011 (Department of Defense, 2012). Most of these casualties were a result of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) and some as the result of small arms fire, indicating that the military
was conducting operations outside of the military bases within Iraq. Still, it is important not to
jump to conclusions that operations conducted outside of the military bases were necessarily to
engage in combat, as such operations could have been a part of sustainability (logistical) convoys
and or route clearance convoys.

Also, no conclusions can be made based on the rate of

causalities, as a wide range of factors can increase causality rates in a hostile environment.
There is one case available that warrants discussion on the context of military operations
that occurred after the August 31st withdrawal. Though not all information is available for
release and further investigation is required to determine if such case is an outlier of the overall
context of military operations conducted after the start of Operation New Dawn, after the
August 31st deadline, one of the remaining AAB’s planned the largest military “displays of
force” in over a year, using M1 Abhram tanks, Stryker Combat Vehicles, helicopters, and fixed
wing aircraft, which was scheduled to be conducted immediately following the public
announcement of Operation New Dawn. The intent of the display of force was to indicate to the
Iraqi region where this AAB operated in that the military had full access to all its combat
capabilities, and would use them if the coalition forces were attacked or was in need of such
firepower. While ultimately the plan was rejected for approval at the next command level for
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being too high profile and outside the commander’s intent for Operation New Dawn, this
indicates that the military actively looked to respond to the policy directive in operations by not
moving forward with such plan.60
The overall assessment of the rhetoric-policy gap between the Presidential directive (to
end all combat missions, for all combat brigades to exit, and the mission shift to supporting
operations) and the military bureaucracy policy output indicates that the rhetoric-policy gap is
found in the composition and doctrine subcomponents, while some preliminary evidence
indicates that operationally, the expectations of policy directive were met.
2.3.2 Military Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Operation New Dawn
After the identification of the rhetoric-policy gap is made, the BEAR Model offers an
avenue to assess how a gap was developed and likewise, to determine the level of responsiveness
that military bureaucracy had to the policy directive. In this section, I go through each of the
four nodes provided by the BEAR Model to assess the level of bureaucratic responsiveness and
to identify the source of the rhetoric-policy gap in this case.
Presidential Power for the Transition
Considering that the initial private policy directive was issued by President Obama on his
first full day in office, prior to an investigation in the three subcomponents of presidential power
offered by the BEAR Model, it is important to examine the policy challenges that occurred
during the transition between the Bush and the Obama administrations. Even with the Obama
administration’s transition effort facing severe complications of inheriting a weak economy and
with Barack Obama being the first president to inherit a war since the Nixon administration,
60

The source of this information is provided by the author, who served in the capacity of an Infantry officer in the
OIF/OND transition as a Brigade Intelligence Planner.
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scholars typically conclude that the 2008-2009 Presidential transition was a success, primarily in
the realm of foreign policy (Randall 2009; Hynek 2009). Keeping in line with the successful
1976 and 1992 transitions, former Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta, with a wide range of
knowledge on policy studies and experience serving as a Washington insider, began to execute
planning efforts for Obama in early 2008 (Burke 2009). While the planning efforts tended to
focus on budget requirements, staffing, personnel needs, and legal issues, additional efforts were
placed on domestic and foreign policy planning.
dominated by the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Therein, foreign policy was topically

While such extended scope in pre-election

planning efforts was also observed under both the Carter and Clinton administrations, there was
a significant difference under Podesta’s leadership as “it did not generate the friction and
infighting with the campaign war rooms that negatively affected those earlier transitions”
(Burke 2009, 575-576). In this regard, the Obama campaign had developed a transition plan that
was more comprehensive than previous incoming administrations.
As the transition into the role of the President was successful and a relatively a non-factor
in the node of presidential power, we now move to the first subcomponent of a presidential
mandate. While no explicit mandate was claimed in the two public announcements from the
President, an implicit mandate was indicated.

For example, as the economic debate

predominately flooded the 2008 presidential elections, still over 10 percent of voters claimed that
Iraq was the most important issue in the election (second to the economy), and of those voters,
59 percent supported Obama in the election with his overall healthy majority vote in the both the
popular (52.9%) and the electoral vote (365).61 This window of electoral success provided
additional strength to the decision to issue the policy directive of a full withdraw based on the
benefits of the honeymoon period (see Beckmann and Godfrey, 2007; Brody, 1991 for the
61

See Condon (2013) for additional election figures.
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benefits of a President conducting actions during a honeymoon period). Additionally, Obama
receive broad popular support on his withdraw plan in Iraq, up to approval of 78% of the public
(Craighill, 2011), as well received broad congressional support (Baker, 2009). Based on the
proposition of the BEAR Model, bureaucratic responsiveness should increase based on a
presidential mandate, which Obama in this case, Obama appeared to have the support from both
the public and the Washington beltway.
Moving to the next subcomponent of precedent, as the subcomponent of centralization is
set in military bureaucracies (as discussed in Section 2.3), it is found that the Obama White
House had a significant level of precedent to direct the military in the transition from OIF to
OND. In respect to the discussion of the OIF/OND transition being a best test case, there is
precedent for the executive to direct the military bureaucracy, as noted that presidential power is
most visible in the realm of foreign policy (Hill, 1998; Fischer 1995, 2000; Sirin and Villalobos
2011). While Presidents can face additional pressures from the public and Congress when
moving military forces into a new engagement, there has been little resistance offered to a
president seeking to move forces away from such engagements. Though disagreements and
political punditry can be found present, there are no known cases that were found where a
president was blocked from removing military forces from a combat zone. In regards to the
specific OIF/OND transition case, President Obama had the full capacity and precedent to direct
the military to withdraw from Iraq, as had previously occurred in a wide range of cases.62
Within the presidential power node, based on the BEAR Model propositions, there are strong
expectations of bureaucratic responsiveness and a minimal rhetoric-policy gap in the presidential
power node.
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Cases include those such as the Clinton Administration pulling troops out of Somalia and Kosovo, President Bush
during the first Gulf War, and President Nixon’s withdrawal of forces out of Vietnam.
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Message Compatibility of the Policy Directive
In this examination of the message compatibility node of the BEAR Model, I begin here
with the structural subcomponent, where the proposition indicates that if a policy directive makes
structural changes to the bureaucracy, bureaucratic responsiveness will likely decrease. In the
OIF/OND transition case, the policy directive required structural changes, as indicated from
establishing a “transitional force,” and removing all combat brigades from Iraq. History of the
military altering its force design indicates that it is both a time and resource intensive task. The
previous design and composition of U.S. military forces was set to meet sizeable forces in battle
as seen in World War I and World War II, the military bureaucracy developed into a division
centric organization, which continued to be intergraded with military doctrine throughout the
cold war in response to the Soviet Union’s military organizational structure. The divisional unit,
consisting of approximating 17,000 troops, was used as the primary component for deployments
of military forces as divisions could be employed in response to threats and were seen as the
ideal design as they could concentrate overwhelming force against professional and standing
armies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the diminishing likelihood of the United States
engaging in a large scale war, and the increasing pressure on military to be a part of peacekeeping and supportive operations where the division centric organizational structure was not
ideally suited, the military institution sought to transition into a less rigid force. The actual
process of shifting to a more brigade centric focus began as early as 1975 with the Division
Restructuring Study lead by Colonel John Foss.63
Starting in 2001, under the guidance of Secretary Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the military
begin to transition into a modular structure of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), which sought to
63

See Wilson (1998) for a discussion on the evolution military composition in both its divisions and separate
brigades
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replace the division centric Cold War military design. The aim of the brigade centric system,
consisting of approximately 3,000 troops, was aimed to allow brigades to be able to swap out
battalions and supporting units with other brigades to meet mission requirements. While the
pressure on the military to convert to this design was high in order meet the operational
requirements in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the constraints of the military bureaucracy only allowed
for a gradual transition into this design, which was still not entirely completed by 2004. With the
advantage of BCTs being modular, as the operating environment shifted to require greater
military effort to conduct stability operations, the military begin to increase the number of
Brigade Combat Team- Stability (BCT-S) in Iraq. The policy directive requiring a new force was
not directly feasible for the military as the BCT system was design for the unit to operate
independently of higher commands as the composition includes support, communication, and
logistical units need for it operate (see previous Figure 2.1). Because of the time required to
make structural changes and the limitations to alter logistical composition, the military shifted all
BCTs to become BCT-S, which they then altered the name to comply with the policy directive,
removing the term combat, stating that they were Advise and Assist Brigades (see Kibbey 2010).
To assess the agency input and first part of the consistency subcomponent (that there
homogeneity of the EOP on a particular policy), it is important to again look at the transition
from the Bush to the Obama administrations as the policy directive from Obama occurred the
day of the transition. The first part of consistency requires that the military bureaucracy receives
a uniform message from the EOP, and considering the change between administrations, if the
message was inconsistent across as short timetable, it could affect bureaucratic responsiveness.
Additionally, if agency input was provided to the Bush administration, it is important to
determine if that information carried over to the Obama administration, as the agency input
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proposition indicates that bureaucratic responsiveness would increase if this was the case.
The Bush administration, similar to the Clinton administration, played an active role in
ensuring a smooth transition for the Obama campaign once the election was completed.
Establishing a “transition council,” the Bush White House allocated resources to conduct
personnel and legal arrangements on behalf of the Obama campaign in order to streamline the
transition process (Burke 2009). President George W. Bush’s prior selection of Robert Gates as
Secretary of Defense, while primarily intended to maintain stability for the end of Bush’s second
term, also provided a source of stability for the incoming Obama administration (both for the
transition period and beyond). After the Republican’s lost the House of Representatives in the
2006 elections, President Bush decided to accept Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
resignation and appoint the less controversial Robert Gates to the newly opened position. While
a Republican, Gates’ appointment was welcomed by both parties and once Gates showed he
could avoid the politically-charged reputation of his predecessor and provide continuity in
defense policy, he became the natural selection for President Barack Obama (Randall 2009).
While Obama had strong rhetoric concerning exactly how he would manage the Iraq war,
Defense Secretary Gates and U.S. Central Command commander General David Petraeus, with
their understanding of previous and proposed decisions for operations in Iraq, played key roles
influencing the actions taken by the Obama administration while maintaining a positive
repertoire with the military bureaucracy (Hynek 2009). In maintaining stability both in terms of
policy direction and implementation of key directives, the cooperation observed across
administrations provided for a smooth transition.
Also prior to President Obama taking office, the Bush administration had begun to lay the
groundwork for reducing the military presence in Iraq by assessing the capabilities of the
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military to withdraw based on the circumstance of how the war had progressed. As the many of
the informational requirements were already cultivated to implement extensive change, this
inherited environment allowed the Obama administration to effectively push his political agenda.
The primary differences between the two administrations was based on their views on the
number of troops that were needed for Iraq, and rate that troops should be withdrawn from Iraq
given changes in conditions on the ground. During Obama’s campaign for the presidency, he
emphasized his intent to end the Iraq War, which he opposed from the beginning, by proposing a
plan to withdraw all forces in 16 months at the rate of one to two brigades every month while
increasing troop levels in Afghanistan (Obama, 2008).

While holding this view until his

election, once elected, the inherited environment modified and clarified his initial policy ideas.
Considering the number of military personnel and the rates at which they should be withdrawn
from Iraq, President Bush had already negotiated a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in
October of 2008 which mapped out the relationship between Iraq and the United States on
political, economic, and security issues prior to Obama taking office (Bruno 2008). The SOFA
agreement provided a timetable for a U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraqi cities by 2009, and this
was the framework used to negotiate the complete removal of forces from the country by the end
of 2011. As such, the assessment of the military’s capability to withdraw forces had already
been mapped out prior to Obama coming into office.
Beyond the agency input prior to the transition, President Obama provided a period to
receive even more agency input as he issued a private policy directive to his national security
team about his intent for Iraq on January 21, 2009, but he did not issue a detailed public directive
until February 27th 2009. This time was used for his advisors and the military establishment,
coupled with the consistent message from both Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, ensured
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that the necessary input was received to refine the details of the policy directive. With both a
smooth transition, a consistent message, and with agency input, it is expected that the
bureaucracy would be responsive based on these subcomponents.
The second part of the consistency subcomponent is the level the uniformity that a
directive has with the bureaucracy’s terminology. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the policy
directive indicated an almost dichotomous shift in terminology consistent with the American way
of war, as the message had a distinct difference from combat to non-combat operations. The
message itself was inconsistent with the way the military was using the terminology of combat
and non-combat operations as actions of the military are based on the spectrum of conflict (refer
back to Figure 2.3). While the military can shift the “aim point” to the far left of the full
spectrum doctrine, increasing the level at which it performs stability operations, the doctrine
itself will still include offensive (combat) and defensive operations. Conducting a full shift (or
dichotomous in nature as the policy directive indicates), between combat operations and stability
operations, is discussed by military practitioners as “easier said than done” in the context of
military interventions (Cavaleri 2005). This difference between the use of the terminology of the
policy directive and the actual interpretation of combat indicates that it is the source of the
rhetoric-policy gap in the doctrinal subcomponent.
Bureaucratic Resiliency in the Operation New Dawn Transition
While the politicization subcomponent was discussed in Section 2.3, I will incorporate
some additional information on politicization in the analysis of the mandate subcomponent of
bureaucratic resiliency, where the proposition is that the more that a policy directive falls within
the mandate of a bureaucracy, bureaucratic responsiveness will increase. Summarily, military
interventions fall within the scope of the military establishment as the various branches of
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service (Navy, Army, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard) have statements of purposes and
mandated missions to provide security, support national policies, and overcome aggressive acts
by other nation states.64 While these are broad stroke mandates, in practice, military interventions
have been a more regular occurrence requiring that these bureaucracies adapt. Essentially, with
the increase in the application of U.S. military force in peacekeeping, short conflicts, military
interventions, and supporting operations, the military establishment has adopted such mandate to
conduct this task in its culture, doctrine, and composition, as for example, the military transition
from a division to a brigade centric organizational structure. Considering the particulars of the
OIF/ONF transition, a withdrawal of forces from Iraq and a reduced level of responsibility was a
welcomed policy directive by the military establishment, whose assets, personnel, and overall
capabilities were stretched thin as it engaged in conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan (see Lake
2012; Shanker 2005). In this case, the military had an additional motivation to reduce its
presence in Iraq in order to focus its resources in Afghanistan, and simultaneously lessen the
strain on military personnel. With these considerations, military responsiveness was increased to
the policy directive.
The last subcomponent of the bureaucratic resiliency node is the capacity of the
bureaucratic institution, where the expectation is that bureaucratic responsiveness will increase if
the military bureaucracy has the capacity to perform the policy directive. In the case of the
OIF/OND transition, the costs associated with the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq were
calculated into both the 2010 and 2011 DOD budgets, including War Funding Supplemental
requests (Department of Defense 2011). As the number of forces had been reducing since 2009
under the SOFA entered into by the Bush Administration, the decreased burden of maintaining
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See Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 3062 (a) for an example of an explicit mandate, which is complimented in the
Army’s doctrine, found in FM-1 (2005).
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the number of forces increased the ability of the military to withdraw forces. Additionally, as the
BCT system which the AAB’s was upon based on having self-sustaining capabilities, the
remaining 50,000 troops after the August 31st deadline were adequately capable of handling the
reduced task. In sum, the military had the full capacity to carry out the policy directive.
External Factors
As identified in the BEAR Model, external factors can condition the relationship between
the military bureaucracy and the executive. In the case of the OIF/OND transition, public
pressure to withdraw forces, and international commitments of the United States, added pressure
on the Obama administration to ensure that the policy directive was met by the military
establishment within the allotted timetable. Here I offer some of the background of this pressure
that conditioned the bureaucratic-executive relationship and increased responsiveness through
the pressure applied to the executive.
The executive’s decision to withdraw “all combat troops” and end “combat operations”
was based on both domestic and international factors. After the initial March 2003 invasion of
Iraq the United States sought international support for its occupation, which it received from the
United Nations Security Council in resolution 1511 on October 16, 2003 which authorized the
presence of military forces and through extensions, lasting until 2008.65 As the final extension
was about to expire, President Bush entered into the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), that
mapped out the relationship between Iraq and the United States on political, economic, and
security issues (Bruno, 2008). The SOFA agreement provided a timetable for U.S. troop
withdrawal from Iraqi cities by 2009 and was the framework used to negotiate the complete
removal of forces from the country by the end of 2011, allowing the military to begin its
65

See Papastavridis (2007) for a discussion on the legal standing and impact of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
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processes for withdrawal. Specific conditions of the agreement during this period, such as us
troop withdrawals from cities, were managed through modifications of such agreements on a
regional basis as, for example, the U.S. military by kept military bases within Iraqi cities, due to
the cost and time used to build them, and conducted unilateral operations outside of city while
conducting only joint-operations within the city. While a gradual drawdown was implemented,
the process was accelerated by the executive due to domestic shifts.
In addition to SOFA, the U.S. experience pressure from its NATO allies with whom it
invoked with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (calling for collective defense) in the U.S. war
on terror. While NATO members were active in the operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. decision
to intervene in Iraq in 2003 was not backed by some of the major European allies. Though
NATO increased its share of operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. involvement in Iraq limited the
degree which the U.S. military was capable of supporting two wars simultaneously. With the
NATO allies was growing tired from the burden of Afghanistan, the U.S. was under pressure to
reduce its presence in Iraq in order to strengthen the alliance that was getting fatigued from the
burden-sharing of military operations (see Hallams and Scheer 2012).
In conjunction with theoretical expectations of democracies and sustained military
engagements, public support for the U.S. war in Iraq diminished along with support of the
presidential administration as mounting casualties, increased costs, ineffective Iraqi elections,
and military scandals, such as Abu Ghraib, made the Iraq war an important topic of the 2008
elections (see Voeten and Brewer 2006). With the previous agreement with Iraq, the desire for
the maintenance of the NATO commitments, and the pressure from the public to end the
intervention, the Obama administration had ample drive to ensure that the policy directive was

89

met by the August 31st deadline. External factors in this case, increased bureaucratic
responsiveness.
2.4 CONCLUSION
In this study’s inquiry to assess if the policy changes from Operation Iraqi Freedom to
Operation New Dawn constituted real change, the Bureaucratic Executive Assessment of
Responsiveness Model was applied. The BEAR Model is unique as it provides a full theoretical
framework to examine both the rhetoric-policy gap and to assess the extent to which
bureaucracies are responsive in meeting such directives. This model addresses a gap that was
found in the literature with respect to the relationship between presidential foreign policy
objectives and military bureaucratic responsiveness, and more broadly, provides a systematic
framework to examine if bureaucratic policy outputs match the expectations of the executives’
policy directives.
In the case of the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn, it
was identified that policy directive had three goals: (1) that combat missions in Iraq will end, (2)
that all combat brigades would exit the country and that only an advise and assist force would
remain, and (3) that the mission will shift from combat operations to supporting the Iraqi
government.

In determining the rhetoric-policy gap for the case, it was found that the

differences between the policy directive and the policy output were based in the doctrine and
composition subcomponents; where the composition of military forces did not change
substantially as the military bureaucracy altered the name of the brigades that remained in Iraq
after the August 31, 2010 deadline, and that the doctrine output of the military did not meet the
dichotomous nature of the policy directives use of combat and non-combat operations. Using the
BEAR Model’s four nodes to assess bureaucratic responsiveness, the propositions offered by the
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model were found to be consistent with the case studied. In the examination, the rhetoric-policy
gap was found to be a product of the message compatibility node, and, more specifically, the
differences that resulted from the structural adjustments required by the policy directive and with
the limitations of message homogeneity between the president and the bureaucracy. Both of
these findings accounted for the rhetoric-policy gap and identified how such gap occurred in the
case. In investigating the research question of Chapter 2 (i.e., Did the direct changes taken by
the military in Iraq reflect the policy change calling for an end of combat operations?), the
BEAR Model offered more than a sufficient framework to examine such questions and
additionally provides a context that other cases can be studied.
The possibilities for future studies on the subject of the military transition in Iraq and the
relationship dynamic between the executive and the military are plentiful. First, in the study of
the transition to Operation New Dawn, a closer examination of the direct actions taken by
military forces in operations can provide a greater insight into the military’s responsiveness to
policy changes.

While there are significant constraints concerning the classification and

restriction of military documents on operations, possible alternatives were offered and other
actions could be taken to investigate the OIF/OND transition through conducting soldier
interviews or by analyzing the events reported by reporters who were embedded with military
forces. When testing these operational changes that occurred in Operation New Dawn, a second
application of the BEAR Model would be warranted, ensuring that a comparison can be made
between the cases. Likewise, in considering the planned 2013 end of combat operations in
Afghanistan, the BEAR Model again offers the framework where these two cases can be
compared. In assessing the rhetoric-policy gap across military interventions, similar studies
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should be conducted in order to determine if Operation New Dawn represents a broad reflection
of military responsiveness to policy shifts or if it is an outlier in such case.
2.4.1 Going Forward: Future Research and Developing the BEAR Model
In this thesis, I have laid the groundwork laid to assess the rhetoric-policy gap and
bureaucratic responsiveness to policy directives. The next step in developing the BEAR Model
will be based on the particular research agenda of those applying the Model. In particular, the
framework lends itself well to studies on both bureaucratic management and political strategy,
where the greatest strides will come from developing additional subcomponents associated with
the BEAR Model nodes as well as in developing quantifiable measures for the propositions.
For investigations on political strategy, the BEAR Model can be employed in conjunction
with decision making and principle-agent theories to investigate different actions that executive
and bureaucratic actors can take in each of the nodes identified in the model. For example, one
can assess the different outcomes of responsiveness based on presidential strategies in the policy
directive, such as going public versus private, vague versus detailed, or, similarly, in the
presidential power node, by identifying variations that the executive can take in claiming (or
even developing) mandates, centralizing/politicizing, and in using precedents to their advantage.
Essentially, by unpacking the nodes in the BEAR model, one can investigate the different
strategies that actors can take and their effect on the rhetoric-policy gap. For instance, while the
BEAR Model identifies that bureaucratic responsiveness will decrease if the policy directive
does not fall under a bureaucracy’s mandate/mission, the political strategies taken by bureaucrats
and the executive can influence the size of the rhetoric-policy gap through actions such as feetdragging or going public. Thus, in identifying possible strategies that can be taken by actors, one
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can use the BEAR Model to assess the differences in the strategy types and their effect on the
rhetoric-policy gap.
BEAR Model can also be developed with a focus on bureaucratic management, which
falls within the broad and rich public policy and administration literature (for which one may
also integrate principle-agent and other organization models). From a bureaucratic management
perspective, one can identify the effectiveness of managerial and bureaucratic procedures on
both responsiveness and their effect on the rhetoric-policy gap. For example, within the capacity
node, one can examine what procedures can maximize the efficacy of the bureaucracy’s
resources in relation to its ability to be responsive to policy directives. Via the existing research
on management effectiveness, one can examine questions such as: what types of composition,
doctrine, and operations are more effective in reducing the rhetoric-policy gap, and how can
bureaucratic entities use information (such as having knowledge on the precedent of certain
policy directives) to develop procedures in expectation of future directives?
Ultimately, this study provides a general framework that warrants future investigation.
The BEAR Model has been demonstrated to have a significant level of utility in investigating the
military transition to Operation New Dawn and while additional work is necessary on both the
case and to test the model, these findings provide a new contribution to the literature on
executive-bureaucratic performance and offer new avenues for future studies applicable to
scholars, policy makers, and bureaucratic professionals.
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